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“Once established, religious intolerance tends to be self-sustaining . . . . So 
every generation must nurture and pass on the commitment to religious 
liberty. Grappling with the difficult and controversial issues of religious 
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The current interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is entirely 
severed from its historical moorings, and modern jurisprudence takes no 
account of the reverence to which its authors attributed it.2  There exists 
today only a disparate reflection of the traditional right of free exercise of 
religion under the First Amendment.  That reflection is largely devoid of 
respect for individual liberty of conscience.  Consequently, those who 
would assert such rights, once inviolate, now must look elsewhere for what 
should be constitutional protection. 
The central infirmity of the Free Exercise Clause stems from a lack 
of recognition of its historical purpose and pedigree.  Its present scope is 
largely confined to the protection of belief, but the Clause was never meant 
to be so limited.3  The Founder’s Free Exercise Clause was a robust 
                                                 
 2. Michael McConnell, Why is Religious Liberty the “First Freedom”?, 21 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2000) [hereinafter McConnell, First Freedom]. 
 3. See generally Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 444 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2013) (stating that the owner of a commercial photography business is free to believe 
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protection for religiously motivated conduct, as the text implies.4  “In the 
Founding Era, religious beliefs, and their expression in a myriad of ways, 
were assumed to be an integral part of individual and communal life.  
Freedom — to object, to dissent, to express religious and conscientious 
belief — clearly was accepted and protected.”5  For that generation, a 
choice between the freedom to believe and the freedom to act was 
essentially no choice at all.6 
Unfortunately, the modern Free Exercise Clause doctrine favors a 
progressive interpretation concerned more with efficiency and practicality 
than meaningful protection of conscience.  Individual liberty of conscience, 
once present in the American legal understanding of free exercise,7 is no 
longer a concern of the First Amendment.  A truly panacean remedy 
requires an introspective look into the foundations of the Free Exercise 
Clause and a careful evaluation of the justifications for the jurisprudential 
departure therefrom.  To that end, this note seeks to reinforce the 
importance and historical understanding of the Free Exercise Clause and 
highlight the incongruities of the modern doctrine in comparison.  Thus, 
part I undertakes a review of the Free Exercise Clause as understood at the 
time of the Founding.  This review, though not exhaustive, is sufficient to 
provide the proper lens through which to view the flaws of the modern Free 
Exercise Clause and the foundations upon which new doctrine must be 
built.  Part II provides a critical analysis of the Supreme Court’s free 
exercise jurisprudence and its relatively recent evolution into the singular 
form this note will refer to as the Smith doctrine.8 
However, highlighting the theoretical flaws of doctrine is not 
enough, nor does it provide an adequate understanding of the current state 
of free conscience in free exercise law, and, accordingly, this note will 
focus on illustrating its effects prominently on display in recent state and 
federal litigation.  Therefore, part III discusses the position of today’s free 
exercise claimant and the stark inability of the Free Exercise Clause to 
provide meaningful protection.  Part IV seeks to provide a workable 
alternative to the Smith doctrine that respects individual religious autonomy 
                                                                                                                 
what they will and make known any objection to same sex marriage but they may not refuse 
to photograph a same sex marriage ceremony on this ground). 
 4. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 5. Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A 
Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 964 
(1995) (footnotes omitted). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 844. 
 8. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) 
(holding that the Free Exercise Clause “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to 
comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law 
proscribes . . . conduct that his religion prescribes . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 
U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))). 
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while recognizing practical necessity in our heterogeneous society.  Part V 
addresses the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a separate but very much 
related part of the broader free exercise landscape, as well as the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,9 which greatly affected 
its interpretation.  Finally, part VI strives to make a cogent argument for the 
recognition of corporate free exercise rights under the First Amendment. 
Overall, the principal goal of this note is to inject life into what is 
now a stale free exercise debate and advocate for a meaningful 
reinterpretation of the Free Exercise Clause that respects its historical 
significance in the First Amendment.  This task is essential for the 
continued protection of free conscience and religious liberty, for “[o]nce 
established, religious intolerance tends to be self-sustaining . . . . So every 
generation must nurture and pass on the commitment to religious liberty.  
Grappling with the difficult and controversial issues of religious liberty is 
part of that responsibility.”10 
I. THE HISTORICAL MEANING OF FREE EXERCISE 
In light of the often bitter debate surrounding the religion clauses of 
the First Amendment, the relative clarity of the historical understanding of 
the Free Exercise Clause can be surprising.  The Founders held a principled 
view of free exercise that is continually misunderstood in modern 
jurisprudence.11  Such understanding can be cataloged in exhaustive detail, 
and the subject has certainly received such treatment.12  Thus, a full 
historical account of the foundations of the Free Exercise Clause and the 
intellectual inspirations from which it came is not the purpose of this 
section.  Instead, the evaluation of the historical understanding of the 
Clause and what it meant to those who authored the First Amendment is 
intended as the lens through which the modern state of free exercise will be 
viewed. 
A. Free Exercise Meant Free Conscience 
An inquiry into the connotations of religious liberty in the colonial 
period yields a starkly different comprehension of free exercise and its 
                                                 
 9. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). In the interest of 
clarity, any use of the short hand Hobby Lobby in the text is a reference to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) unless 
expressly indicated otherwise. 
 10. Laycock, supra note 1, at 451. 
 11. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 546–47 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 12. For a thorough and complete analysis of the historical understanding and 
background of the Free Exercise Clause, see Flores, 521 U.S. at 544–65 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting); Laycock, supra note 1; Michael McConnell, The Origins and Historical 
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990) [hereinafter 
McConnell, Origins]; Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5. 
2015] STRIKING A BALANCE 189 
place in the First Amendment than the one that predominates in the law 
today.  Were this not the case, modern jurisprudence would have yielded 
decisively divergent results.13  Instead, the current interpretation 
characterizes free exercise as a sort of conditional benefit yielding 
inevitably to the generally applicable law and providing protection only for 
religious targeting.14  Essentially, this has relegated the Free Exercise 
Clause to something akin to an equal protection analysis for religion with 
little independent meaning, and this view is utterly inconsistent with the 
historical understanding of religious liberty in early America.15  At the time 
of the Founding, “when religious beliefs conflicted with civil law, religion 
prevailed unless important state interests militated otherwise.”16  The latter 
interpretation envisions a meaningful Free Exercise Clause able to maintain 
its historic significance while the former deprives the Clause of its 
constitutional importance. 
While the First Amendment eventually contained the phrase “free 
exercise” of religion, the fundamental liberty interest that necessitated the 
Free Exercise Clause was freedom of conscience.17  The implicit 
understanding was this right protected individuals in their private as well as 
their public lives.18  The conception of free exercise as individual free 
conscience is no small detail. Neither is the importance that this distinction 
held in the mind of the Founders.19  “Of all of the ‘fundamental rights’ 
heralded during the Founding Era, calls for freedom of conscience were the 
most insistent and the most intense.”20  The individual’s freedom of 
conscience was equally vital to both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists 
during the constitutional convention.21  James Madison wrote, 
“[c]onscience [is] the most sacred of all property,” and “the exercise of 
[conscience is] a natural and unalienable right” as it did not base its 
legitimacy on positive law but on one’s duty to God.22  Thus, liberty of 
conscience was not subject to state control simply because it was seen as a 
natural right rather than a privilege granted by the state.23  In this way, 
individual free conscience could not be abrogated by a lesser sovereign 
authority without adequate justification.24  Such a view was shared by some 
of the founding generation’s principal intellectual inspirations.25  Therefore, 
                                                 
 13. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 845. 
 14. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
 15. Id. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 16. Flores, 521 U.S. at 552 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 17. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 844. 
 18. Id. at 845. 
 19. Id. at 891. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1559, 1600 (1989). 
 22. Id. at 1601. 
 23. McConnell, Origins, supra note 12, at 1497. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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“[o]ur Nation’s Founders conceived of a Republic receptive to voluntary 
religious expression, not a secular society in which religious expression is 
tolerated only when it does not conflict with a generally applicable law.”26 
The drafting process of the Free Exercise Clause also provides 
powerful evidence that the Founders advocated for the protection of 
freedom of conscience.27  This issue was of great importance among the 
states before ratification.28  The first drafts of the religious clauses were not 
as succinct as they would ultimately become, and their development speaks 
volumes about their purpose.  James Madison was the main architect of 
both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses,29 and he proposed their 
first draft to the House in 1789.30  It read: “The civil rights of none shall be 
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national 
religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be 
in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”31  The draft shows freedom of 
conscience was closely associated with the Founder’s conception of free 
exercise. In fact, the terms “rights of conscience” and “free exercise of 
religion” were often used synonymously.32  The phrase “rights of 
conscience” also appeared in the second draft as well as the final version 
approved by the House.33  Similarly, the first draft of the religious clauses 
in the Senate read: “Congress shall make no law establishing one Religious 
Sect or Society in preference to others, nor shall the rights of conscience be 
infringed.”34  Professor Michael McConnell has emphasized several 
important aspects of Madison’s early draft including the use of the term 
“rights of conscience” and its strictly protective language.35  The adoption 
of the term “free exercise” itself is also vastly significant.36  It demonstrates 
that Congress adopted the broadest possible version of the amendment by 
including the word “exercise” because it protects action along with belief.37  
Thus, the new language was no abandonment of the emphasis on 
conscience but simply an adoption of the most inclusive phrase. 
B. Liberty of Conscience Included Religious Conduct 
It is vital to understand not only the founding generation’s 
conception of free exercise but also the scope to which they attributed that 
                                                 
 26. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 564 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 27. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 919–20. 
 28. Laycock, supra note 1, at 411. 
 29. Id. at 410. 
 30. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 920 n.380. 
 31. Id. 
 32. McConnell, Origins, supra note 12, at 1482–83. 
 33. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 920 n.380. 
 34. Laycock, supra note 1, at 411–12. 
 35. McConnell, Origins, supra note 12, at 1481–82. 
 36. Id. at 1490. 
 37. Id. 
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right.  Liberty of conscience was often described as, “free exercise of 
[r]eligion according to the dictates of conscience.”38  Moreover, the 
historical record demonstrates how free exercise was never limited to 
worship or belief.39  “Religion was the expression of the beliefs dictated by 
conscience; restrictions on religious exercise were restraints on the freedom 
of conscience itself.”40 
Early provisions of colonial charters, accordingly, protected most 
religiously motivated decisions.41  Such provisions uniformly worked their 
way into early state constitutions, and every state, save one, had adopted a 
clause protecting free exercise by 1789.42  These early clauses were 
extremely broad. Four states protected any act that was a result of religious 
convictions.43  States’ free exercise clauses at this time were much more 
detailed than the federal Free Exercise Clause would become, and many, 
specifically, identified state interests weighty enough to constrain the right 
of free exercise.44  The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 is 
representative: 
Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to 
worship GOD according to the dictates of his own 
conscience, and reason; and no subject shall be hurt, 
molested, or restrained in his person, liberty or estate for 
worshipping GOD, in the manner and season most 
agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience . . . 
provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or disturb 
others, in their religious worship.45 
“These state provisions . . . are perhaps the best evidence of the original 
understanding of the Constitution’s protection of religious liberty.”46  Most 
states referenced worship in their free exercise clauses, but there is no 
record of any litigation over religious action not qualifying as worship. This 
lack of litigation indicates the distinction changed little regarding the scope 
of free exercise protection.47 At the time, the nation’s overwhelmingly 
Protestant religious view would have necessitated such a broad definition of 
free exercise because there would not have been a sharp distinction between 
worship and daily life.48 
                                                 
 38. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 891. 
 39. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 553 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 40. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 919. 
 41. McConnell, Origins, supra note 12, at 1427. 
 42. Flores, 521 U.S. at 552–53 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 43. McConnell, Origins, supra note 12, at 1459. 
 44. Flores, 521 U.S. at 552–53 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 45. Id. at 553 (quoting N.H. CONST. art. 1, § 5). 
 46. Id. at 553. 
 47. McConnell, Origins, supra note 12, at 1460–61. 
 48. Id. at 1460. 
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Based on the 18th Century worldview, free exercise would have 
necessarily included religiously motivated action. “Different degrees of 
protection for religious belief and religious action would have been seen as 
essentially meaningless, since the idea of belief without action was not seen 
as a viable choice.”49 The Founders viewed the right of free exercise as a 
protection of religious conduct the denial of which was presumptively 
illegitimate, and only strong societal concerns such as public health or the 
infringement of other private rights would have justified governmental 
regulation.50 Such a view “make[s] sense only if the right to free exercise 
was viewed as generally superior to ordinary legislation, to be overridden 
only when necessary to secure important government purposes.”51 Although 
the Founders held a broad array of denominational beliefs, “they were 
virtually unanimous in the belief that the republic could not survive without 
religion’s moral influence. Consequently, they did not envision a secular 
society, but rather one receptive to voluntary religious expression.”52 There 
is also little historical evidence that the Founders sought to maintain 
neutrality between religion and non-religion.53 Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, 
“[f]or the Americans the ideas of Christianity and liberty are so completely 
mingled that it is almost impossible to get them to conceive of the one 
without the other.”54 While this may seem at odds with today’s frenetic 
calls for the abolition of the religious from public life, there is undeniable 
evidence that the Founders saw religion as indispensable to good 
government and that religion, in general, was something to be encouraged 
and nurtured.55 
Yet, the point emphasized here is not to pretend to make any new 
religious argument that has not already been convincingly made. Instead, it 
is to serve as a reminder, at the outset of the inquiry into modern doctrine, 
of the foundations upon which the Free Exercise Clause was built and to 
provide a lens through which to view the current state of the right. To be 
sure, asking whether a modern claim would be protected under the 
Founder’s conception of the Free Exercise Clause will not solve all of our 
jurisprudential problems. However, if we are to attempt to remain true to 
the foundations of our country’s “first freedom,”56 we at least must give 
some thought to the answer. 
                                                 
 49. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 964. 
 50. Id. at 964–65. 
 51. Flores, 521 U.S. at 555 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 52. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 21, at 1595. 
 53. Id. at 1645. 
 54. McConnell, First Freedom, supra note 2, at 1257. 
 55. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 21, at 1572. 
 56. McConnell, First Freedom, supra note 2, at 1244. 
2015] STRIKING A BALANCE 193 
II. THE MODERN EVOLUTION OF FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE 
The Supreme Court’s attitude toward free exercise has seen drastic 
ebbs and flows.57 In 1878, the Supreme Court held there could be no 
excusal from the criminal prohibition of polygamy merely “because [the 
offender] believed the law which he had broken ought never to have been 
made.”58  Essentially the Court adhered, at that particular time, to a free 
exercise distinction between religious belief and religiously motivated 
conduct despite the historical evidence to the contrary.59  However, the 
dividing line between religious belief and conduct would not last long after 
the mid-twentieth century.60  The Court’s “decidedly unsympathetic”61 view 
of free exercise shifted dramatically in 1963.62  Less than a decade later, in 
1972,63 the constitutional protection of free exercise reached its zenith in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.64  Unfortunately, the doctrinal importance of 
the Free Exercise Clause in the First Amendment was short lived, and the 
free exercise landscape changed again, perhaps most dramatically of all, in 
1990 when the Supreme Court handed down its controversial decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith.65  Smith fashioned a veritable retraction of 
free exercise jurisprudence, and it continues to be a rallying point for free 
exercise reform. 
A. Pre-Smith Precedent 
In the recent history before Smith, the Supreme Court was 
relatively protective of free exercise claims.66  One of the foremost 
examples was the Court’s decision in Sherbert v. Verner involving the 
claim of a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church who was fired for 
refusing to work on Saturday, “the Sabbath Day of her faith.”67  Her 
dismissal on these grounds disqualified her from receiving unemployment 
                                                 
 57. Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1709, 1713–
15 (2000). This Article largely focuses on the historical foundations of free exercise and the 
departure of the Supreme Court’s free exercise doctrine from those foundations in the Smith 
decision. Necessarily, early Supreme Court free exercise precedent is not examined here. For 
an evaluation of such precedent from the time of the Founding, see Laycock, supra note 1 
 58. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878). 
 59. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1114 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Revisionism]. 
 60. For a careful analysis of major precedent for both the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Establishment Clause, see John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment 
and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 847 (1984). 
 61. Choper, supra note 57, at 1713. 
 62. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 63. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 64. Choper, supra note 57, at 1715. 
 65. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 66. Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, 
Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 851 (2001). 
 67. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399. 
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benefits under state law.68  The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected her 
free exercise claim, finding that she was not prevented from exercising or 
observing her conscientious religious beliefs.69  For the first time, the 
Supreme Court granted constitutional relief solely under the Free Exercise 
Clause.70  In one of the opinion’s most important points, the Court noted 
past cases upholding burdens on free exercise all involved conduct that 
“invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace, or 
order.”71  Here, the Court demonstrated a jurisprudential view of the Free 
Exercise Clause that comported with a historical understanding of the 
Clause.  Unsurprisingly, such language neatly tracks Madison’s 
understanding of the permissible burdens of free exercise which recognized 
the impossibility of protecting all religiously inspired conduct and 
established that paramount state interests are required to justify such 
burdens constitutionally.72 
With the adoption of this Free Exercise Clause interpretation, the 
Sherbert Court expressly required the finding of a compelling governmental 
interest to justify a burden on a claimant’s free exercise rights.73  In such a 
“highly sensitive” area of constitutional interpretation, the Court was 
careful to remark “no showing merely of a rational relationship to some 
colorable interest would suffice[.]”74  Ultimately, no compelling interest 
was found, and the denial forced the claimant “to choose between following 
the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits[.]”75  The state’s 
argument that the denial was valid because unemployment benefits were a 
privilege, not a vested right, was dismissed out of hand: “It is too late in the 
day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed 
by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.”76  
Accordingly, the Court found that the denial constrained the claimant to 
abandon religious conviction in violation of her free exercise rights,77 and 
Sherbert, thus, reaffirmed the constitutional importance of the Free 
Exercise Clause and provided concrete protection reflective of that 
importance.78 
A decade later, that protection reached its high-water mark79 in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder.80  Yoder held the Free Exercise Clause prevented the 
                                                 
 68. Id. at 401. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Choper, supra note 57, at 1714. 
 71. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. 
 72. McConnell, Origins, supra note 12, at 1464. 
 73. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. 
 74. Id. at 406. 
 75. Id. at 404. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 410. 
 78. For a thorough evaluation of Sherbert and the creation of the substantial burden 
requirement in free exercise law, see Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of 
Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989). 
 79. Choper, supra note 57, at 1715. 
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state of Wisconsin from requiring Amish children to attend formal high 
school until the age of sixteen.81  Until 1990, Yoder remained the landmark 
decision in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.82  Perhaps its most 
significant contribution is the intensely fact-specific manner with which the 
Court analyzed the free exercise claim.83  Unlike the position taken later in 
Smith, the Court focused on the unique pressure the Wisconsin law placed 
on Amish families and their religious autonomy.84  The Court surveyed 
Amish traditions, beliefs, and the effects of compulsory secondary 
education on their rural way of life.85 
 
In sum, the unchallenged testimony of acknowledged 
experts in education and religious history, almost 300 years 
of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained 
faith pervading and regulating respondents’ entire mode of 
life support the claim that enforcement of the State’s 
requirement of compulsory formal education after the 
eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free 
exercise of respondents’ religious beliefs.86 
 
The Court noted its goal of preserving religious liberty “[b]y preserving 
doctrinal flexibility and recognizing the need for a sensible and realistic 
application of the Religion Clauses . . . .”87  It warned that the dispensation 
of such claims is a delicate task and found the claim did not come from a 
“recently discovered” or “progressive” group but one supported by 
centuries of history.88  By employing such a factual methodology, the Court 
avoided the rigid application of overbroad standards and remained willing 
to take into consideration the specific burdens placed upon individual free 
exercise. 
Yoder’s attention to detail is perhaps its best attribute; however, set 
against modern free exercise law, its rationale concerning the applicability 
of the law also remains salient.  Here, the Court expressly rejected the 
notion that “regulations of general applicability” placed the affected 
conduct beyond the protection of the Free Exercise Clause.89  One of the 
most important, and often overlooked, portions of the opinion states: 
                                                                                                                 
 80. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 81. Id. at 234. 
 82. Duncan, supra note 66, at 853. 
 83. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216–19. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 219. 
 87. Id. at 221. 
 88. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235. 
 89. Id. at 220. 
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Nor can this case be disposed of on the grounds that 
Wisconsin’s requirement for school attendance to age 16 
applies uniformly to all citizens of the State and does not, 
on its face, discriminate against religions or a particular 
religion, or that it is motivated by legitimate secular 
concerns.  A regulation neutral on its face may, in its 
application, nonetheless offend the constitutional 
requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly 
burdens the free exercise of religion.90 
Importantly, the Court neither rejected Wisconsin’s interests in requiring 
education nor questioned its power to enact compulsory education laws,91 
and the law itself was not invalidated.92  It was the law’s specific 
application to the Amish community which posed the constitutional 
problem.93  Wisconsin was left on its own to work out “reasonable 
standards” to protect the continued education of Amish children while 
respecting their right of free exercise.94 
B. The Current Free Exercise Standards 
When the Court turned sharply away from the rationales of 
Sherbert and Yoder with the Smith decision in 1990, our First Freedom 
became our “most embattled.”95  Smith envisioned a move away from the 
case specific analysis of Yoder toward a streamlined Free Exercise Clause 
jurisprudence. Instead of the Sherbert compelling interest test, the Smith 
Court strove for the doctrinal clarity of broad standards.  The Smith doctrine 
certainly has this quality in spades; however, it lacks the attention to detail 
and the seriousness of the previous free exercise inquiry, and this loss 
vastly outweighs the benefit gained through its black letter clarity.  
Nevertheless, the Smith decision is the foundation of the entire body of 
current free exercise law. 
1. The Smith doctrine 
Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment in Smith, but she 
strongly disagreed with the new free exercise standard laid down by the 
majority.96  She remarked, “[t]here is nothing talismanic about neutral laws 
of general applicability or general criminal prohibitions, for laws neutral 
                                                 
 90. Id. (emphasis added). 
 91. Id. at 221. 
 92. Id. at 236. 
 93. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 228–29. 
 94. Id. at 236. 
 95. McConnell, First Freedom, supra note 2, at 1265. 
 96. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 891 (1990) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
2015] STRIKING A BALANCE 197 
toward religion can coerce a person to violate his religious conscience or 
intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws aimed at 
religion.”97  Alongside the Court’s pre-Smith precedent and the historical 
understanding of free exercise, Justice O’Connor’s statement is steadfastly 
consistent.98  Nonetheless, Smith’s basic tenant is that it is a “permissible” 
reading of the Free Exercise Clause “to say that if prohibiting the exercise 
of religion . . . is not the object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect 
of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First 
Amendment has not been offended.”99 
The unemployment compensation claim brought in Smith famously 
involved the drug peyote, a plant-derived hallucinogen, used in traditional 
ceremonies of the Native American Church in Oregon.100  When the 
plaintiffs filed their claims, they were denied unemployment compensation 
due to their ingestion of the Oregon schedule I drug, peyote.  This drug use 
constituted misconduct which nullified their unemployment eligibility.101  
The Court’s summary of the legal relationship between the law and the 
relevant conduct represents the simplistic way in which the Smith doctrine 
can be applied to generally applicable laws: “Because respondents’ 
ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, and because that 
prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent with the Free Exercise 
Clause, deny respondents unemployment compensation when their 
dismissal results from use of the drug.”102  Yoder’s goal of preserving 
religious autonomy through doctrinal flexibility was abandoned.103  In fact, 
it was cited only once in a string cite and in a completely new context.104 
Smith does not deny the Free Exercise Clause protects actions as 
well as beliefs,105 but it does withhold free exercise protection unless the 
offending law is “specifically directed” at particular conduct in a non-
neutral fashion.106  Therefore, strictly speaking, no law infringes upon one’s 
right of free exercise unless that law was passed specifically to target 
specific groups or conduct.107  This rather circular rationale is fatal to every 
free exercise claim brought under a generally applicable law.108 
                                                 
 97. Id. at 901. 
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a. The Flaws of Smith’s Free Exercise Interpretation 
The Smith decision has been widely criticized for its monumental 
shift in free exercise theory.109  Regardless of whether Smith is seen 
favorably or unfavorably,110 it is not difficult to pin down the underlying 
concern which prompted the decision. “[F]ear of religious pluralism is the 
root of Justice Scalia’s much-maligned majority opinion in Smith.”111  The 
language of the opinion indicates practical concerns about maintaining a 
fact-specific free exercise standard.112 
 
In Smith, the voice whispering in Justice Scalia’s ear 
warned him that a strongly protective free exercise doctrine 
would place at risk not only drug laws but also laws 
dealing with compulsory military service, payment of 
taxes, manslaughter, child neglect, compulsory vaccination, 
traffic regulation, minimum wages, child labor, animal 
cruelty, environmental protection, and racial equality.  In 
short, the social contract itself might not survive a 
constitutional rule protecting religiously motivated conduct 
from governmental restrictions.113 
 
This was the exact concern of the Court in Reynolds, cited by Smith, which 
stated the notion of permitting stringent free exercise protection would 
“permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”114 
There are two flaws with this assumption.  First, Sherbert and 
Yoder dealt successfully with the same concern nearly a century after 
Reynolds.115  Furthermore, there is no evidence a flood of free exercise 
claims bombarded the Supreme Court after the Sherbert decision in 1963.  
Second, these concerns are unnecessary from the historical perspective of 
free exercise.  The above examples of rampant law-breaking would not be 
permissible because these types of regulations are justified by the 
compelling state interests of protecting private rights and public safety.116  
In fact, it is reasonable to assume Smith’s new interpretation was 
                                                 
 109. René Reyes, The Fading Free Exercise Clause, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725, 
730 (2011). 
 110. For a more complementary analysis of the Smith decision based on a conception of 
the Free Exercise Clause largely as a protection of religious equality, see Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, Free Exercise, and the 
(Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1189, 1195 (2008). 
 111. Duncan, supra note 66, at 853 (footnote omitted). 
 112. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. 
 113. Duncan, supra note 66, at 854. 
 114. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 
(1878)). 
 115. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963). 
 116. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 965. 
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unnecessary to uphold the Oregon drug law since the Court could have 
simply found the regulation justified by these same governmental interests.  
Justice O’Connor expressly recognized this in her concurrence.117  Even 
supporters of Smith’s general interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause 
have acknowledged this point: “The Smith opinion itself, however, cannot 
be readily defended.  The decision, as written, is neither persuasive nor 
well-crafted.  It exhibits only a shallow understanding of free exercise 
jurisprudence and its use of precedent borders on fiction.  The opinion is 
also a paradigmatic example of judicial overreaching.”118 
Justice O’Connor found the majority’s “parade of horribles” 
unconvincing.119 She pointed out such concerns have always been present, 
yet, the compelling interest standard has proven itself workable.120 
Professor McConnell addresses Smith’s practical concerns from a different 
angle.121 
Consider the fact that employment discrimination laws 
could force the Roman Catholic Church to hire female 
priests, if there are no free exercise exemptions from 
generally applicable laws . . . . Or that churches with a 
religious objection to unrepentant homosexuality will be 
required to retain an openly gay individual as church 
organist, parochial school teacher, or even a pastor. Or that 
public school students will be forced to attend sex 
education classes contrary to their faith. Or that religious 
sermons on issues of political significance could lead to 
revocation of tax exemptions. Or that Catholic doctors in 
public hospitals could be fired if they refuse to perform 
abortions. Or that Orthodox Jews could be required to 
cease and desist from sexual segregation of their places of 
worship. If the Court wishes to consider a parade of 
horribles, it should parade the horribles on both sides. But 
while the two parades may be of the same length, they are 
of very different quality. The judicial system is able to 
reject claims that would be horrible if granted; believers are 
helpless to deal with infringements on religious freedom 
that the courts refuse to remedy.122 
                                                 
 117. Smith, 494 U.S. at 903 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 118. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. 
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This string of examples exposes a fundamental problem with the Smith 
doctrine.  Smith sacrifices free exercise claims of good merit due to 
concerns about the efficient application of constitutional law, and it places 
the strictures of generally applicable laws upon a pedestal beyond the reach 
of the Free Exercise Clause.  Consequently, there has not been a single 
grant of relief under Smith’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause since 
1993.123 
Oddly, Smith also attempts to rely on the political process for the 
protection of free exercise rights, noting pointedly that several states have 
implemented laws exempting sacramental peyote use from their respective 
criminal drug laws.124  This reassurance misses the mark since it is 
irrelevant to Free Exercise Clause interpretation how many states chose to 
protect peyote use legislatively. “[T]he First Amendment was enacted 
precisely to protect the rights of those whose religious practices are not 
shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility.”125  The Free 
Exercise Clause exists in the First Amendment specifically for this reason.  
The Court recognized that relegating free exercise protection to legislatures 
“will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not 
widely engaged in,” yet, it maintains this is an “unavoidable 
consequence.”126  Justice Blackmun’s thoughts on this idea are prescient: “I 
do not believe the Founders thought their dearly bought freedom from 
religious persecution a ‘luxury,’ but an essential element of liberty-and they 
could not have thought religious intolerance ‘unavoidable,’ for they drafted 
the Religion Clauses precisely in order to avoid that intolerance.”127  As 
Justice Blackmun eloquently stated, such resignation, concerning the loss of 
free exercise protection, cannot be squared with the historical reverence for 
the Free Exercise Clause nor the rest of our First Amendment 
jurisprudence.128 
                                                 
 123. Reyes, supra note 109, at 725. 
 124. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
 125. Id. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 126. Id. at 890 (majority opinion). 
 127. Id. at 909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 128. The reverence with which the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment has 
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the Smith doctrine’s result-oriented treatment of the Free Exercise Clause.  Justice Brandeis’ 
famous précis of the Founder’s motivations for including the right of free speech in the First 
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deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.  They valued liberty both 
as an end and as a means.  They believed liberty to the secret of happiness 
and courage to be the secret of liberty.  They believed that freedom to think as 
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery 
and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion 
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate 
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest 
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b. “Hybrid” Free Exercise Theory 
The Smith Court outright stated “[w]e have never held that an 
individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an 
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”129 
Given the facts of Yoder, this is a bit perplexing.  Accordingly, the Court’s 
explanation of this statement has been criticized as “strange and 
unconvincing.”130  The Court explains its disregard of Yoder and Sherbert 
in a very unique way by classifying those decisions as an entirely separate 
category of First Amendment cases involving “the Free Exercise Clause in 
conjunction with other constitutional protections.”131  Under this 
explanation, the exemption from mandatory high school attendance in 
Yoder was justified only by the confluence of free exercise rights and the 
parental substantive due process right to control the education of 
children.132  Thus, the combination of free exercise rights, or any 
constitutional right, with another fundamental right creates a “hybrid” claim 
deserving greater protection because of the combined liberty interests.133  
Since Smith presented no such combination, the free exercise claim did not 
receive consideration because no exception may be made to the generally 
applicable law.134  Under this explanation of past precedent, the Court 
created a new framework with which to analyze claims of religious 
liberty.135 
Justice Souter openly criticized the hybrid rights theory and Smith’s 
attempt to distinguish prior free exercise precedent in a later free exercise 
case.136  He stated, “[t]hough Smith sought to distinguish the free-exercise 
cases in which the Court mandated exemptions from secular laws of general 
application, I am not persuaded.”137  He believed Yoder left no doubt about 
                                                                                                                 
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political 
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American 
government. 
 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  He continued, 
“[b]elieving in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed 
silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form.  Recognizing the occasional 
tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and 
assembly should be guaranteed.” Id. at 375–76. See also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640–42 (1943). Such eloquent sentiment should inspire pride and 
respect for the entire First Amendment, including the Free Exercise Clause. 
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 131. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
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its focus on the free exercise of religion.138  Such sentiment has been widely 
shared in legal scholarship:139 “Yoder is like a moth that experienced 
pupation for nearly two decades in a free exercise cocoon only to emerge in 
Smith as a hybrid case involving both free exercise and parental rights.”140  
Professor McConnell voiced a suspicion alleging, “the notion of ‘hybrid’ 
claims was created for the sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder in this 
case.”141  Regardless, it is not an explanation that has enjoyed much support 
by the federal judiciary.142 
2. Lukumi 
Smith has a companion in Church of the Lukumi Babalu v. City of 
Hialeah.143  However, Smith dominates the structure to the point that 
Lukumi supports no substantial weight of its own.144  Thus, Lukumi is part 
of the existing framework, although it functions only secondarily.145  The 
initial suit was brought to challenge a city ordinance passed in Hialeah, 
Florida, which was, as discussed in depth by the Court,146 almost certainly 
written for the specific purpose to prevent the religious sacrifice of animals 
by a local Santeria church.147  This fact alone is the most important aspect 
of the case, and it is why Lukumi is relegated to a secondary role in modern 
free exercise jurisprudence.148 “The record in this case compels the 
conclusion that suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship 
service was the object of the ordinances.”149  This conclusion changed the 
fundamental rubric used to evaluate the constitutionality of the law.150  
Thus, no compelling interest is required to uphold a neutral law; instead, 
evidence of specific targeting of religious practice was sufficient to 
mandate a more faithful application of strict scrutiny so that “many laws 
will not meet the test.”151  “A law that targets religious conduct for 
distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests only 
against conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only 
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in rare cases.  It follows from what we have already said that these 
ordinances cannot withstand this scrutiny.”152 
Lukumi establishes a small measure of meaningful free exercise 
protection still exists in a very specific capacity, but this corner is tight 
indeed.153  Only clear religious animus allows a claim to bypass the Smith 
doctrine.  Essentially, this requires ineptly drafted legislation or particularly 
damaging legislative history.154  The claim in Lukumi involved both.155  
Blatant evidence like this demonstrates how Lukumi was not a close case.156  
The ordinance affected only the Santeria church, and the legislative history 
demonstrated it was written specifically for that purpose.157  For this reason, 
the decision serves only as a warning against religiously antagonistic laws, 
but it is not a viable conduit for free exercise claims.158 
3. Smith and Lukumi as Unitary Doctrine 
It has been argued “that free exercise is alive and well in the wake 
of Smith and (particularly) Lukumi.”159  As the theory stands, Smith is 
merely the gatekeeper to the more stringent standards of Lukumi, and the 
more meaningful protection available in cases of religious targeting is a 
workable compromise between fears of religious pluralism and the 
protection of religious liberty.160  That Smith serves a gatekeeping function 
is an apt comparison theoretically,161 but this has not played out in 
practice.162  If there was reason to be optimistic the Smith-Lukumi duo 
would adequately protect free exercise in 1993, it is no longer warranted. 
Indeed, the Smith decision has proven itself such a proficient gatekeeper 
that no claim has gained access to Lukumi’s heightened standard at the 
Supreme Court level since it was decided.163 
By way of comparison, the respective conduct at issue in Smith and 
Lukumi deserves attention as well.  The protected practice in Lukumi is not 
the prototypical free exercise conduct one might expect to find shelter in a 
post-Smith universe.  The Santeria church, long persecuted in Cuba, 
conducted animal sacrifices at ceremonies for events like marriages, births, 
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and acceptance of new members.164  Smith, on the other hand, concerned 
the ingestion of peyote during sacramental worship by Native Americans.165  
It is worth noting the irony involved in the protection of the conduct in 
Lukumi and the denial of protection for traditional Native American 
practices in Smith.  This demonstrates the incongruous application of the 
Smith doctrine.  At its core, Smith protects laws, not conduct.  One of the 
most damaging aspects of the Smith decision is that the conduct at issue is 
not relevant to the outcome.166  Only the law is given scrutiny, not the 
religious exercise, and this fosters a lack of respect for the right. 
After Lukumi, Justice Scalia lamented that it turned the Smith 
inquiry into one concerned only with the intent of the drafters of the law at 
issue.167  He maintains this was not his position when writing the Smith 
opinion which, instead, was to focus on the law’s effects.168  The point is 
well taken, but an analysis of the intent of the drafters is now necessary 
under Lukumi.169  This is another inherent flaw in the Smith doctrine. 
Essentially, the analysis has evolved from a debate about the protection of 
conduct versus belief,170 to a careful inspection of the individual burden on 
free exercise,171 into an inquiry that disregards the religious conduct 
entirely.  The latter evolution has put tremendous distance between free 
exercise and liberty of conscience. 
III. THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF THE MODERN FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
The current free exercise jurisprudence, completely severed from 
the historical emphasis on free conscience, has resulted in a curious 
consequence in modern free exercise law.  “Smith appears to leave the Free 
Exercise Clause without independent constitutional content and thus, for 
practical purposes, largely meaningless.”172  The Smith doctrine has 
essentially relegated the Free Exercise Clause to a position of such low 
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importance that any claim relying solely thereon is almost certain to fail.  
This interpretation would surely seem strange to a founding generation that 
attributed such importance to the careful protection of religious freedom. 
A. The Position of the Current Free Exercise Claimant 
In effect, the Smith doctrine is a grant of legislative immunity to the 
generally applicable law, and it has relegated the Free Exercise Clause to a 
truly dependent state.  It is no exaggeration the First Amendment portion of 
a given free exercise argument is likely the least significant aspect of any 
claim.  The Free Exercise Clause and the rights it once protected are quite 
literally relegated to a footnote in Supreme Court jurisprudence.173  “[T]he 
fact that the Free Exercise Clause has become so doctrinally otiose is itself 
an argument for reinvesting the Clause with independent meaning.”174  If 
this was not apparent after Smith, modern case law has surely made it so, 
and there is no better example than the recent litigation out of New Mexico 
in Elane Photography v. Willock.175  Elane Photography involves an 
intermingling of state law with First Amendment principles, including free 
speech and free exercise.176  Overall, the case is a comprehensive 
demonstration of the present impotence of the Free Exercise Clause and the 
insignificance of free exercise claims.  The irony in Elane Photography and 
similar cases is the lack of real consideration of free exercise of religion 
despite the glaring implications for individual free conscience. 
Elane Photography, owned in part by Elaine Huguenin,177 is 
engaged in commercial photography in New Mexico.178  When it declined 
to photograph a same-sex wedding ceremony, it found itself in the midst of 
a lengthy discrimination suit under the New Mexico Human Rights Act 
(“NMHRA”).179  Elane Photography’s claim the NMHRA 
unconstitutionally burdened free exercise proved unsuccessful as the 
judgment against it was upheld by the New Mexico Court of Appeals,180 
and, in 2013, the New Mexico Supreme Court.181  Before the case reached 
its final resolution, some commentators believed it should be resolved on 
the grounds of a compelled speech argument alone.182  However, the free 
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exercise facet of the case is unmistakable, and the pursuit of alternative 
arguments shows the lack of confidence in such an argument.183 
While Elane Photography initially advanced a myriad of claims in 
support of its assertion the state statute interfered with its free exercise of 
religion, the treatment of its First Amendment argument is a forceful 
example of the insignificance of the Free Exercise Clause in modern 
litigation.184  Before the New Mexico Supreme Court, the analysis of the 
free exercise claim was dwarfed by that of the compelled speech issue.185  
Most importantly, the Free Exercise Clause analysis centered, as it must 
under Smith, on the statute itself, not the free exercise burden.186  Left with 
no alternative, given Smith’s unyielding application, Elane Photography 
was forced to devote much of its efforts to the applicability of the statute. It 
focused on the law’s exemptions in an effort to show it was not generally 
applicable and, thus, not subject to Smith’s standards.187  The court rejected 
the argument that specific exemptions, such as home sales, prevented the 
statute from being found generally applicable.188 
The exemptions in the NMHRA are ordinary exemptions 
for religious organizations and for certain limited 
employment and real-estate transactions. The exemptions 
do not prefer secular conduct over religious conduct or 
evince any hostility toward religion. We hold that the 
NMHRA is a neutral law of general applicability, and as 
such it does not offend the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment.189 
The hybrid right argument was also quickly dismissed on the grounds it was 
not adequately briefed,190 likely because the lower court pointedly cited 
                                                                                                                 
Photography should be decided in favor of the claimant based on the theory that forcing the 
company to take photos of same-sex weddings is controlled speech and so violates Elane 
Photography’s right to choose what type of speech to create within the meaning of Wooley 
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)). 
 183. Aside from the necessary interplay between these two fundamental protections of 
the First Amendment, the compelled speech aspects of the case are not addressed here. For a 
summary of the free speech aspects of Elane Photography, see generally Susan Nabet, Note, 
For Sale, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1515 (2012) (discussing Elane Photography in detail with 
respect to the free speech arguments and implications). 
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the New Mexico Constitution, the Free Exercise Clause, the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, and the New Mexico Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Elane Photography, 284 P.3d 
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argument, including the hybrid rights portion. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 73–76. 
 186. Id. at 73–75. 
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 189. Id. at 75. 
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widespread criticism of the theory.191  In the end, the New Mexico Court of 
Appeals summed up the position of Elane Photography, and all free 
exercise claimants in similar positions, quite succinctly: They “must accept 
the reasonable regulations and restrictions imposed upon the conduct of 
their commercial enterprise despite their personal religious beliefs . . . .192  
The owners are free to express their religious beliefs and tell [plaintiff] or 
anyone else what they think about same-sex relationships and same-sex 
ceremonies,” but they simply may not refuse to photograph them.193  
Regrettably, such sentiment no longer seems controversial in today’s free 
exercise law. 
The sort of analysis employed by the New Mexico state courts is 
worryingly simplistic, but, generally speaking, this is not the fault of state 
courts charged with the application of the federal interpretation of the Free 
Exercise Clause.  The focus on the law and not the merit of the free exercise 
claim is a natural consequence of the Smith doctrine.  General applicability 
now equals inviolability, and there is no room for individualized analysis.  
Thus, today’s free exercise jurisprudence under Smith refuses to wrestle 
with difficult questions of religious liberty because of the specter of 
religious pluralism.194 
B. Reliance on State Law 
The unmistakable consequence of Smith’s “virtual abandonment”195 
of the Free Exercise Clause forces claimants to rely on state law to 
vindicate free exercise rights. This is an inherently odd position for a First 
Amendment right to find itself, especially one so revered at the 
Founding.196  It is also a position that necessarily yields drastically different 
results, and, at least in this context, that is not a positive attribute. The 
position of the modern free exercise claimant is wholly dependent upon the 
nature of state protection of religious liberty.197  If that protection is 
inadequate, and it often is, the sterility of the Free Exercise Clause becomes 
ever more glaring. 
State judiciaries have spent a considerable amount of time 
balancing the Supreme Court’s rationale in Smith with countervailing 
interests in state constitutions, and this is ongoing today just as in the wake 
                                                 
 191. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 442–43 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013). 
 192. Id. at 443. 
 193. Id. at 444. 
 194. Duncan, supra note 66, at 853. 
 195. Smith, supra note 172, at 231. 
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of the decision.198  At least eleven states have held that their respective state 
constitutions mandate free exercise protection consistent with pre-Smith 
jurisprudence.199  Relying on these provisions often yields positive results 
for claimants and the most effective alternative to First Amendment 
claims.200  However, this is not the case in a majority of states.  
Furthermore, state constitutional claims face several structural obstacles.201  
The relevant body of law is often undeveloped in state courts because of the 
unfortunate (and overused) practice of interpreting state and federal 
constitutional provisions identically.202  Thus, there is often no meaningful 
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2015] STRIKING A BALANCE 209 
state precedent on which to rely.203  In turn, this leads to a continuation of 
this same trend as state courts remain in lockstep with the federal standard 
even when it takes a drastic turn as it did in Smith.  It is the job of the state’s 
highest court to interpret the Constitution, and if that court has not done so 
with respect to free exercise, it is not the fault of the claimant. Nor is it a 
convincing argument for failing to address the issue when it is before the 
court. 
More fundamentally, state courts are often loath to interpret similar 
state provisions differently from the federal counterpart.204  At times, state 
supreme courts do not wade deeply enough into the state constitutional 
interpretation, and some are seemingly uninterested in the question at all.  
In one particularly troubling example, the New Jersey Supreme Court found 
no reason to consider whether the New Jersey Constitution provides greater 
protection to free exercise after citing the state equivalent of the 
Establishment Clause.205  The preceding paragraph of Article I of the New 
Jersey Constitution begins, “[n]o person shall be deprived of the 
inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a manner agreeable 
to the dictates of his own conscience,”206 yet the court neither cited this 
provision nor discussed its relevance to the argument for greater state 
protection of free exercise.207  Similarly, Elane Photography turned to the 
New Mexico Constitution in hopes the court would find a greater degree of 
protection for free exercise than the federal Constitution.208  The court 
showed no inclination to open this line of inquiry and maintained the 
continued use of “federal standards to analyze Elane Photography’s free 
exercise of religion claim.”209  It indicated the New Mexico Constitution 
prohibited only the forced support of certain denominations.210  Much like 
the previous example, the quoted portion of the New Mexico Constitution 
left out a portion of Article II, Section 11 which states “[e]very man shall 
be free to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience.”211  
Whether this should be sufficient to confer greater protection under the 
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New Mexico Constitution, as the concurring opinion suggests,212 is 
certainly debatable, but it surely is relevant to the discussion. 
Ultimately, this sort of shiftless state constitutional interpretation 
has serious consequences both for claimants and the development of 
coherent state constitutional law. Litigants often fail to assert these claims 
because of the begrudging reception and inattention these claims sometimes 
receive.213  When asserted, they too often are only an afterthought. To be 
sure, many state courts have dutifully considered these claims, and several 
have found stringent protection in the state constitution’s religion 
clauses.214  Nevertheless, apathetic state constitutional interpretation will 
always exist leaving the protection of free exercise scattered.  Such division 
is reason enough to conclude that state constitutional protection cannot fill 
Smith’s void. 
IV. RESTORING INDEPENDENT SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FREE EXERCISE 
CLAUSE 
Recent cases like Elane Photography denote a rather bleak view of 
the importance of individual liberty of conscience and treat religious liberty 
more as a practical impossibility than a historically venerable right.  Given 
the track record of free exercise claimants since Smith was decided in 1990, 
it is not unreasonable to conclude the Free Exercise Clause has permanently 
shed its historical significance in our modern jurisprudence.215  The 
degradation of the Free Exercise Clause has been met with resignation and 
treated as an unavoidable consequence in the orderly progression of society 
as the fear of religious pluralism has infected nearly every aspect of free 
exercise law.216  This trend must be reversed if there is to be a 
reinvigoration of protection for free exercise and free conscience. 
A. Returning to Pre-Smith Doctrine and the Historical Understanding 
of Free Exercise 
Religion is not intrinsically shielded from the burdens of neutral or 
generally applicable law, no matter the definition bestowed on those 
terms.217  The intolerable burdens of the Smith doctrine have proven even 
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more threatening than the practical concerns it was invented to remedy.218  
Fortunately, the restoration of the Free Exercise Clause does not require 
revolutionary constitutional interpretation.  It requires only a return to the 
pre-Smith jurisprudence, the historical underpinnings of the Free Exercise 
Clause, and its purpose in the First Amendment.  Fundamentally, this 
doctrine is simple.  Madison characterized free exercise as an inherent right 
presumptively protected so long as there is no interference with public 
peace and security or private rights.219  This is a simple yet powerful free 
exercise theory, workable in practice, and key to returning doctrinal 
significance to the Free Exercise Clause. 
Madison’s understanding, what may be called a historical approach 
to free exercise,220 is more than mere theory, however. It has already held 
an important place in the Supreme Court’s free exercise precedent. In 
Sherbert, the Court noted that while free exercise cannot be immune from 
all legislative restriction, “[t]he conduct or actions so regulated have 
invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.”221  
Recognizing the need to balance necessity with the burden a regulatory 
system places on religious exercise, the Court managed a workable standard 
during this period that respected religious autonomy as much as possible, 
yielding to regulatory schemes only when a paramount societal concern was 
threatened, in other words, when there was a compelling governmental 
interest.222  This standard is essentially Madison’s theory gilded in modern 
terminology, and there is no reason to think it cannot provide a workable 
Free Exercise Clause framework today, just as it did in the pre-Smith era. 
1. Shifting the Burden to the Government 
One of the most important aspects of the Sherbert compelling 
interest test is that the government must justify the burden on the present 
claimant.223  This focus alone will cause a dramatic departure from the 
current inquiry.  The Smith doctrine’s application guarantees two 
consequences in the presentment of every Free Exercise Clause claim.  
First, it requires the claimant to show non-neutrality before the court will 
even consider the burden on free exercise.  The vast majority of a 
claimant’s argument must be devoted to this issue, and it is usually outcome 
determinative barring the application of Lukumi.224  Claimants seize on this 
argument because it is the only realistic way to avoid the application of 
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Smith, but, practically, it ensures the government never has to justify its 
regulation relative to its burden on religious exercise.  The second 
consequence is partly a product of the first.  Because claimants must first 
argue non-neutrality, the entire judicial inquiry is dominated by the law’s 
applicability, and courts do not have occasion to consider the individualized 
burden on free exercise.225 
Both of these collateral consequences will be reversed with a re-
adoption of the Sherbert compelling interest test. It will ensure that, once a 
claimant has demonstrated an encumbrance on free exercise, the ultimate 
burden will rest with the government to exhibit a compelling state interest 
justifying its constitutionality.226  This is certainly nothing new in the 
protection of important individual rights, but it drastically alters how the 
modern free exercise claim will be adjudicated.  The claimant will still bear 
the responsibility of proving an actual burden on religious exercise, but this 
will restore a vital element to this litigation because the religious burden 
will be evaluated upfront by courts, ensuring that individualized attention 
will be given to all claims.227  The main inquiry will shift toward the merit 
of the claim and away from the law’s applicability.  This will place the right 
of free exercise back into its proper perspective.  There will first be an 
“assumption of freedom of conscience” that will be negated only where a 
compelling governmental interest is found.228  These procedural 
developments are vital to the resurrection of the Free Exercise Clause. 
2. The Least Restrictive Means Requirement 
The compelling interest portion of the Sherbert test is relatively 
straightforward although the Court has enunciated it somewhat differently 
over time.229  However, there is one aspect of the Sherbert era jurisprudence 
that is not so settled. If the Court overrules Smith and reinstates the Sherbert 
test, it would have to decide another question:  Whether the pre-Smith 
jurisprudence (and thus the new standard) includes a least restrictive means 
requirement.230  While there is currently a divide among the Court on this 
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issue and evidence to support both arguments,231 there can be no doubt that 
its inclusion would greatly benefit the protection of religious liberty. 
In Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Smith, he remarked: 
This Court over the years painstakingly has developed a 
consistent and exacting standard to test the constitutionality 
of a state statute that burdens the free exercise of religion. 
Such a statute may stand only if the law in general, and the 
State’s refusal to allow a religious exemption in particular, 
are justified by a compelling interest that cannot be served 
by less restrictive means. Until today, I thought this was a 
settled and inviolate principle of this Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence.232 
Whether the least restrictive means requirement is indeed a settled portion 
of the standard depends on an appraisal of some imprecise language.  A 
cursory reading of the Court’s pre-Smith precedent indicates the compelling 
interest requirement is the entirety of the inquiry.  Neither Sherbert nor 
Yoder explicitly mentioned the least restrictive means requirement by name, 
but they did employ very similar language.233  This requirement was not 
used by name in United States v. Lee,234 and the Court also did not discuss 
it in Smith during its analysis of the Sherbert test.235  However, the issue 
requires a closer inspection, and there is reason to believe the least 
restrictive means requirement did historically have a place in this 
jurisprudence, albeit a rather subtle one. 
The Court eventually used this exact language in the free exercise 
context in Thomas v. Review Board, where it paired the compelling interest 
test with the least restrictive means requirement.236  Long before this, the 
Sherbert Court indicated it would be incumbent upon the party defending 
the statute to show “that no alternative forms of regulation” would serve the 
same purpose without burdening the right of free exercise.237  Similarly, 
language in Yoder referenced a similar idea—”only those interests of the 
highest order and those not otherwise served” may prevail over free 
exercise claims.238  As Professor Thomas Berg has aptly pointed out, the 
Court later likened this language to the implementation of true strict 
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scrutiny review for free exercise claims, including the least restrictive 
means requirement.239 
If the Sherbert standard is reinstated, the Court will have to make a 
determination on this issue.  Recently, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the 
Court had occasion to address this very question (in the context of 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act), and it is clear there is a split of 
opinion.  The Hobby Lobby majority maintained that pre-Smith 
jurisprudence did not include the least restrictive means standard,240 while 
the dissent vigorously argued the standard was used prior to Smith and the 
Court’s statement to the contrary in Flores was incorrect.241  Because this 
question is one of interpretation, this issue will likely lead to a strong debate 
and be difficult to predict if the Court reconsiders its free exercise doctrine.  
However, it is important to keep in mind the corollaries between the 
compelling interest standard and the least restrictive means requirement.  
“[T]he least restrictive means component is a logical entailment of the 
compelling interest standard: if a less burdensome regulation will serve the 
government’s interest, then the need to apply the more burdensome one is 
not compelling.”242  Professor Burg’s analysis has strong logical force. 
 
The least restrictive means prong was not applied to 
exemption claims in a rigid or absolute fashion before 
Smith.  Rather, this factor produced (as did the 
Sherbert/Yoder test overall) a balancing approach, with 
application of a general law qualifying as the least 
restrictive means if—but only if—other courses of 
regulation would significantly undermine the state’s ability 
to protect its most important goals. This is a sensible, 
moderate, yet religion-protective approach.243 
 
If the Court were to readopt the Sherbert test, it would do well to explicitly 
include the least restrictive means requirement in the new standards. This 
framework has proven itself a strong protector of religious liberty in the 
past as well as workable in application.244 If any new interpretation aims to 
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recognize the historical significance of the Free Exercise Clause and liberty 
of conscience, this “exceptionally demanding” standard could play a key 
role.245 
3. The Importance of Preserving Doctrinal Flexibility 
The Yoder Court spoke of the need to preserve doctrinal flexibility 
in order to achieve a rational application of the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment.246  Such flexibility is needed now more than ever, and the 
Sherbert test is nothing if not fact intensive. Sherbert and Yoder represent 
careful, individualized judicial inquiries, yet this framework was abandoned 
in the name of judicial efficiency and practicality.  While there is much to 
be said for the practical consideration of judicial efficiency, it is not a 
concept that may shape the interpretation of the First Amendment. Justice 
O’Connor stated: 
[t]o me, the sounder approach—the approach more 
consistent with our role as judges to decide each case on its 
individual merits—is to apply this test in each case to 
determine whether the burden on the specific plaintiffs 
before us is constitutionally significant and whether the 
particular criminal interest asserted by the State before us is 
compelling . . . the First Amendment at least requires a 
case-by-case determination of the question, sensitive to the 
facts of each particular claim.247 
There is reason to believe the Court is currently shifting back in 
favor of such a philosophy in the broader realm of religious freedom, and 
the least restrictive means requirement (discussed above) could play an 
important role here as well.  In Hobby Lobby, Justice Kennedy wrote a 
careful concurring opinion in which he pointedly emphasized that the 
government failed to satisfy the least restrictive means requirement 
mandated by RFRA.248  While his remarks were tailored specifically to 
RFRA’s application, he predicted the least restrictive means standard 
“might well suffice to distinguish the instant cases from many others in 
which it is more difficult and expensive to accommodate.”249  This point 
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was made after he emphasized the Court’s fact specific holding.250  In short, 
he seems to indicate he views the least restrictive means standard as a 
flexible device capable of distinguishing claims on a case-by-case basis.  
This is quite similar to Professor Berg’s characterization of the standard as 
a sensible device for the protection of religious liberty.251  Reading into 
Justice Kennedy’s statements, there is reason to believe the least restrictive 
means standard could again assume such a role. 
B. Addressing the Specter of Religious Pluralism 
“Behind every free exercise claim is a spectral march; grant this 
one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will be confronted with an 
endless chain of exemption demands from religious deviants of every 
stripe.”252  A similar thought was certainly on Justice Scalia’s mind while 
writing the opinion in Smith.253  However, the importance of free exercise 
deserves, and the First Amendment requires, a greater commitment to the 
purpose of the Free Exercise Clause and the protection of free conscience. 
The Smith majority feared the continued application of the Sherbert 
line of cases might allow each conscience to become a law unto itself.254  
The problem is that this framework proved workable for some twenty-seven 
years.  It characterizes the extension of the compelling interest doctrine as 
“courting anarchy” and lists a multitude of laws that would find themselves 
suddenly in constitutional jeopardy.255  But the Court’s examples are largely 
regulations easily justified by compelling governmental interests, and 
Justice O’Connor has forcefully made this point: “The Court’s parade of 
horribles not only fails as a reason for discarding the compelling interest 
test, it instead demonstrates just the opposite: that courts have been quite 
capable of applying our free exercise jurisprudence to strike sensible 
balances between religious liberty and competing state interests.”256  Would 
the government be able to demonstrate taxation is supported by a 
compelling interest justifying the free exercise burden on those who believe 
they should not have to pay them?  The answer is obviously yes, and it has 
already met this burden in the pre-Smith era.257 
Somewhere along the line, the debate on this issue has shifted from 
an emphasis on the importance of religious freedom to accusations of 
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requests for “preferential treatment.”258  This is a very strange perspective. 
Seeking protection offered by free exercise of religion under the Free 
Exercise Clause is no more seeking preferential treatment than is asserting 
the right to freedom of expression under the Free Speech Clause.  “Only 
beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause which, 
by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion.”259  
Regardless of whether Smith’s fears of religious pluralism are justifiable in 
the abstract, they are not justifiable in light of the Court’s existing 
precedent,260 and they are no more so today.  “If the Free Exercise Clause is 
viewed as enacting a zero-sum game between democracy and religious 
pluralism, we will all lose something of inestimable value.”261 
V. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT AND HOBBY LOBBY 
As vitally important as the doctrinal interpretation of the First 
Amendment is, a thorough examination of the current state of free exercise 
law also requires a look beyond the Free Exercise Clause itself.  The Smith 
decision caused significant changes in separate but related areas of the law 
in addition to its jurisprudential shift.  The most important collateral 
consequence of Smith is the reaction it elicited from Congress in the form 
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), enacted in November 
of 1993.262  As the title implies, RFRA was a pointed, even bipartisan, 
response to the Court’s decision in Smith three years earlier.263  It reinstated 
the compelling interest requirement in an effort to override the Smith 
doctrine and the general applicability exception.264 
Congress ensured RFRA’s purpose was well understood by listing 
five findings that supported the statute’s passage including the blunt 
statement that Smith “virtually eliminated the requirement that the 
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral 
toward religion.”265  More importantly, the statute clearly states its 
purpose—to reinstate the Sherbert test.266 However, it is vital to point out 
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(emphasis added). 
 260. Marshall, supra note 118, at 308–09. 
 261. Duncan, supra note 66, at 855. 
 262. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006). 
 263. Reyes, supra note 109, at 730. 
 264. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. 
 265. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a). 
 266. The relevant portion reads: 
The purposes of this chapter are (1) to restore the compelling interest test 
as set forth in [Sherbert] and [Yoder] and to guarantee its application in 
all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and 
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the text of the statute does more than merely revive the compelling interest 
requirement.267  It reads: “Government may substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to 
the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.”268  The inclusion of the least restrictive means requirement, the 
significance of which was unclear with respect to pre-Smith law, has proven 
vitally important in RFRA’s evolution.269 
A. RFRA’s Constitutionality and Applicability 
Facially, RFRA was the simple solution to the Smith doctrine that 
Congress intended.  In application, however, it had significant 
constitutional problems of its own that have severely limited its 
effectiveness.  In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court held RFRA, as applied 
to the states, exceeded the enforcement powers of Congress under the 
Fourteenth Amendment by attempting “a substantive change in 
constitutional protections.”270  Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy 
succinctly explained the rationale: 
Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise 
Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress 
does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what 
the right is.  It has been given the power “to enforce,” not 
the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional 
violation.  Were it not so, what Congress would be 
enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the 
“provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].”271 
The Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power is characterized as 
“remedial” for this reason.272  An attempt to alter, rather than enforce, 
constitutional protections through the Fourteenth Amendment runs afoul of 
“vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal 
balance,” and RFRA, as applied to the states, was found guilty on this 
count.273  After Flores, RFRA no longer provided an alternative cause of 
action for free exercise claimants burdened by state law which drastically 
                                                                                                                 
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is 
substantially burdened by government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b). 
 267. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997). 
 268. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (emphasis added). 
 269. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 270. Flores, 521 U.S. at 532. 
 271. Id. at 519 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5). 
 272. Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)). 
 273. Flores, 521 U.S. at 536. 
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reduced its scope.274, As a corollary, there is yet another important limitation 
on RFRA’s application that has received only limited treatment in federal 
court.275  RFRA’s language states “government” shall not substantially 
burden religious exercise and appropriate relief may be obtained “against a 
government.”276  Thus, questions abound with respect to RFRA’s 
application to suits between private parties.  When it was addressed, it 
initially resulted in a miniature circuit split.277  Both the Sixth278 and 
Seventh279  Circuits have expressly held that RFRA does not apply to such 
suits by interpreting its statutory language to require government action.  
The Ninth Circuit has also expressed doubts about RFRA’s application to 
nongovernmental actors.280  Only the Second Circuit, in Hankins v. Lyght, 
indicated it believes RFRA has application in suits between private 
parties.281  However, this was in a very narrow context.282  The division is, 
in reality, not much of a split as then Judge Sotomayor’s dissent in Hankins 
is often cited to counter the majority’s reasoning.283  In fact, the Second 
Circuit later criticized the decision itself.284  For all practical purposes, there 
are at least four circuits currently limiting RFRA’s application to suits in 
which the government is a party, increasing its handicap twofold. 
These restrictions essentially foreclose all but one of RFRA’s 
applications.285  RFRA originally was, and still is, applicable to the federal 
                                                 
 274. For further discussion of Flores’ evaluation of the constitutionality of RFRA, see 
Martin S. Sheffer, God Versus Caesar: Free Exercise, The Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, and Conscience, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 929 (1998); While she agreed with the 
separation of powers analysis in Flores, Justice O’Connor took the opportunity to advocate 
that the Court “correct the misinterpretation of the Free Exercise Clause set forth in Smith” 
so it “would then be in a position to review RFRA in light of a proper interpretation of the 
Free Exercise Clause.” Flores, 521 U.S. at 545 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The Court of 
course declined to do so citing the same concerns proffered in Smith. Id. at 534–35 (majority 
opinion). 
 275. Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 276. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006). 
 277. For one of the most recent summaries of this case law in federal court, see In re 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 485 B.R. 385, 388–92 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2013). 
 278. Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 411–
12 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 279. Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 280. Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 834 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 281. Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 282. Id. (reasoning that since the statute at issue could have been enforced by a federal 
agency, RFRA could serve as a defense to that action regardless of whether it applies to suits 
between private parties more generally). 
 283. McGill, 617 F.3d at 411 (discussing the weight of the decision in Hankins and 
Judge Sotomayor’s dissent in determining that RFRA does not apply to suits between private 
parties); see also In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 496 B.R. 905, 915 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 
2013). 
 284. Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 203 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 285. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 
n.1 (2006). 
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government,286 and it is in this context that the statute has secured a 
foothold.287  In 2006, RFRA displayed its vitality in federal litigation in 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita, which involved the use of a sacramental tea 
regulated under the Controlled Substances Act.288  The case involved facts 
strikingly similar to those in Smith, and RFRA’s application proved 
dispositive.289  Even though the government could point to a compelling 
interest for including the substance in the Controlled Substances Act, this 
was not enough to satisfy the “focused” inquiry mandated by RFRA 
because the specific harm at issue must be evaluated against the 
governmental interests.290  O Centro Espirita proved RFRA could provide 
formidable protection for free exercise when its applicability requirements 
are met. 
In practice, however, RFRA determines the outcome of only a 
narrow set of cases today, and the free exercise claims arising out of state 
regulation or private disputes are left to rely on state law as an alternative to 
the Smith doctrine.291  Unless burdened by federal law, the typical free 
exercise claimant is unaffected by RFRA, and its role, while noteworthy, 
has not been of tremendous significance in free exercise law until recently. 
B. RFRA and Corporate Free Exercise 
There is one application of RFRA that merits special attention in 
light of recent litigation, and, here, there is reason to be a bit more hopeful 
about RFRA’s dexterity.  This application involves RFRA’s protection of 
corporate free exercise in the context of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).  
The recent litigation involving the ACA and its controversial contraception 
mandate is a dramatic example of the continually evolving exploration of 
the strength and interpretation of RFRA by federal courts.  After the 
Supreme Court upheld the ACA in National Federation of Independent 
                                                 
 286. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006). 
 287. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); O Centro 
Espirita, 546 U.S. 418. 
 288. O Centro Espirita, 546 U.S. at 423. 
 289. See id. at 432. 
 290. Id. 
 291. It is true that most free exercise claims are unaffected by RFRA today and so are 
still evaluated by the same standards that RFRA was enacted to change. However, there is 
one particular area in which free exercise claims are not in the same position, though not 
because of RFRA. Religious land use specifically has been altered greatly by another federal 
statute aimed at protecting particular free exercise concerns relating to religious land use and 
zoning laws. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) mandated 
that the compelling interest test be used in relation to land use regulations that burdened free 
exercise. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. For a discussion of RLUIPA and its impact in relation to free 
exercise claims, see Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional 
Zoning Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929 (2001). See also Marci A. Hamilton, 
Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311 (2003). 
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Business v. Sebelius,292 a massive body of litigation over the contraceptive 
mandate became center stage.293  The law’s preventative care requirements 
mandate effected health plans to include the full range of FDA approved 
contraceptives, including intrauterine devices and “emergency 
contraceptives” described as “abortifacients” because they cause the demise 
of a fertilized embryo.294  Numerous lawsuits were filed challenging the 
contraception mandate resulting in a divisive split among federal courts 
destined for Supreme Court resolution.295  This split was eventually 
resolved on June 30, 2014, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,296 but the road 
towards resolution was an interesting and eventful one. 
1. RFRA’s Application at the District Court Level 
At the outset of this now gigantic body of litigation, it was clear 
corporations faced an exceedingly difficult task to prevail on their claims 
that the contraceptive mandate constituted a substantial burden on their 
exercise of religion under RFRA.  The reception of these claims in federal 
district courts was largely unsympathetic, and litigants faced significant 
obstacles.  The first major decision in this string of cases was Hobby Lobby 
Stores v. Sebelius.297  Because the denial of Hobby Lobby’s injunction in 
this case was, at first, upheld via interlocutory appeal by both the Tenth 
Circuit298 and Supreme Court,299 it quickly became the standard citation in 
subsequent opinions in district courts all over the country.300  Essentially, 
the district court’s decision was a wellspring for the body of law that 
reached the Supreme Court.  It is, therefore, instructive to quickly examine 
the Court’s treatment of Hobby Lobby’s RFRA claim. 
The plaintiff corporations, Hobby Lobby and Mardel, operate 514 
arts and crafts stores and 35 Christian bookstores, respectively, and both are 
                                                 
 292. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 293. John K. DiMungo, The Affordable Care Act’s Contraceptive Coverage Mandate, 
35 NO. 1 INS. LITIG. REP. 5 (2013). 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 297. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1288 (W.D. Okla. 
2012), rev’d, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 298. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6294 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012). 
 299. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct 641 (2012). 
 300. For an array of cases citing the Hobby Lobby district court in their decision to deny 
temporary injunctions to the ACA, see Gilardi v. Sebelius, 926 F. Supp. 2d 273, 281 (D.D.C. 
2013) (citing Hobby Lobby for the proposition that corporations do not pray or worship); 
Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1115–16 (D. Colo. 2013) (citing Hobby Lobby in 
its denial of the same injunction); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. 
Supp. 2d 394, 412–13 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (citing Hobby Lobby to hold that corporations do not 
enjoy free exercise rights); Grote Indus., LLC v. Sebelius, 914 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949–50 
(S.D. Ind. 2012) (citing Hobby Lobby in deciding any burden on free exercise caused by the 
ACA mandate was not substantial). 
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owned and operated by the Green family in accordance with their religious 
faith.301  Hobby Lobby and Mardel argued the mandatory provision of 
abortifacients is a substantial burden on free exercise in violation of 
RFRA302 among other things.303  Before this claim could be reached on the 
merits, the litigants encountered what would become the foremost obstacle 
in similar litigation throughout the federal court system—RFRA’s 
application to the corporate form.  Parsing statutory language, the district 
court sidestepped the fact that federal law statutorily defines the term 
“person” to include corporations and held the act inapplicable.304  The court 
reasoned, “[g]eneral business corporations do not, separate and apart from 
the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees, 
exercise religion.  They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take 
other religiously-motivated actions separate and apart from the intention 
and direction of their individual actors.”305  Bolstered by this conclusion, 
the court declined to enjoin to the mandate’s enforcement.306 
Members of the Green family also asserted RFRA claims on behalf 
of themselves.307  Theoretically, their RFRA claims should stand a much 
better chance of success than the claims of the corporations.  However, the 
corporate aspects of the Green’s claim invaded the analysis of their 
individual argument under the substantial burden prong of the RFRA.308  
The court employed an incredibly strict substantial burden requirement 
                                                 
 301. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284–85 (W.D. 
Okla. 2012), rev’d, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 302. Id. at 1285. 
 303. The Greens, of course, also argued that the mandate violated their rights under the 
Free Exercise Clause itself but to no avail. Id. at 1285, 1287. The court announced that “the 
rights of corporate persons and natural persons are not coextensive,” seizing upon a 
distinction between constitutional rights available to corporations and “personal” rights 
available only to individuals. Id. at 1287–88 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978)). Since Hobby Lobby and Mardel are not religious 
organizations, the court reasoned they could not have rights under the Free Exercise Clause. 
Id. at 1288. 
 304. Id. at 1291. See also 1 U.S.C. § 1. 
 305. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291 (W.D. Okla. 
2012), rev’d, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 306. Id. at 1296–97. 
 307. Id. at 1292. 
 308. Id. at 1293. To make a prima facie claim for a RFRA violation under Tenth Circuit 
precedent, a claimant must prove (1) a substantial burden imposed by the government, (2) on 
a sincere, (3) exercise of religion. Id. at 1292 (citing Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960 
(10th Cir. 2001)); As previously discussed, this is one of the most troubling aspects of 
forcing claimants to rely on a federal statute, or any statute, rather than the First 
Amendment. Instead of the government bearing the burden of proving a compelling interest 
to justify the regulation of free exercise, the claimant has the burden of proving the existence 
of what was a constitutionally protected right in a statutory cause of action 
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taken from existing Seventh Circuit precedent.309  Accordingly, a burden is 
only substantial if it, “necessarily bears direct, primary, and fundamental 
responsibility for rendering religious exercise . . . impracticable.”310  Under 
this stringent test, it is no wonder the court found it unlikely that a 
substantial burden could be established because the relationship between 
the ACA mandate and the burden on free exercise was too “indirect and 
attenuated.”311 
This litigation ultimately proved itself a perfect opportunity for 
RFRA to once again become relevant in the protection of free exercise, but 
the initial returns, represented by the district court opinion in Hobby Lobby 
v. Sebelius, were certainly not encouraging.  It was only at the Circuit Court 
level that litigants enjoyed a more favorable interpretation of RFRA, and, 
even then, such decisions were in the minority.312 
2. RFRA’s Circuit Split 
Treatment of RFRA’s application to for-profit corporations 
continued as the main point of contention at the circuit level, and the 
majority of courts found the statute inapplicable.313  While the Tenth Circuit 
reversed the denial of the injunction in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius,314 the 
district court’s reasoning resonated nonetheless in other circuits.  After 
quoting the Hobby Lobby district court’s statement regarding the inability 
of corporations to pray and worship separate from their owners, the Third 
Circuit in Conestoga Wood demonstrated its rather jejune rationale: 
                                                 
 309. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1294 (W.D. Okla. 
2012), rev’d, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 310. Id. (quoting Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 
761 (7th Cir. 2003)). The current ACA litigation is not the only area in which such a 
restrictive interpretation of the substantial burden inquiry has been employed. See, e.g., 
Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir. 2006); Civil 
Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d 752. 
 311. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1294 (W.D. Okla. 
2012), rev’d, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). See also Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 
1117 (D. Colo. 2013) (finding that the ACA mandate does not prevent plaintiff from 
personally exercising religion and that any burden on individual free exercise is “slight and 
attenuated”). 
 312. See infra note 317. 
 313. Three of the five circuit courts to consider the issue either found that a for-profit 
corporation could not exercise religion or did not qualify as a person under RFRA. See 
Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013); 
Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties 
Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013). Two 
circuits found RFRA applicable. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013); Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 314. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub 
nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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[o]ur conclusion that a for-profit, secular corporation 
cannot assert a claim under the Free Exercise Clause 
necessitates the conclusion that a for-profit, secular 
corporation cannot engage in the exercise of religion. Since 
Conestoga cannot exercise religion, it cannot assert a 
RFRA claim. We thus need not decide whether such a 
corporation is a ‘person’ under the RFRA.315 
While the analytical foundation for this conclusion varied slightly in other 
circuits and employed more nuance, the fundamental premise remained 
largely the same.316  The Hobby Lobby district court’s austere substantial 
burden analysis received much less attention.  This was largely a 
consequence of procedure since this question was not reached in cases 
where RFRA was found inapplicable.317  The three circuits that did reach 
the substantial burden issue attributed much more weight to the stringent 
standard required by the statute.318 
Ironically, Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, was the first circuit decision to 
expressly hold that at least some corporations qualified as persons capable 
of exercising religion under RFRA.319  In a sweeping reversal of the district 
court, the Tenth Circuit found not only that the Dictionary Act’s320 
inclusion of corporations in the meaning of “persons” was sufficient to 
warrant RFRA’s application but, also, the right of free exercise is not so 
purely personal as to make it unavailable at least to some corporate 
forms.321  The court also pointedly questioned the foundational validity of 
the alternative interpretation.322  While the Tenth Circuit decision was a 
major reversal, three other circuits expressed views similar to that of the 
                                                 
 315. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 385–88. 
 316. See Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1211–12 (stating that to determine whether a corporation 
may qualify as a person under RFRA, the corporation’s capability to exercise religion must 
first be addressed); Autocam, 730 F.3d at 625 (agreeing with Conestoga Wood that a 
corporation cannot assert a claim under RFRA because a corporation is not a person as 
defined in the statute and cannot exercise religion). 
 317. Autocam, 730 F.3d at 625–26 (forgoing the substantial burden analysis because 
Autocam did not qualify as a person under RFRA); Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 388–89 
(finding it unnecessary to address the substantial burden analysis since the corporation could 
not assert a claim under RFRA and the owners could not assert their own free exercise rights 
through their business). 
 318. Korte, 735 F.3d at 683; Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1218; Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. 
Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1141 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 319. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1129 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d 
sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 320. The Dictionary Act, as its name implies, is a broad collection of definitions for 
terms used in federal statutes. The Act itself states that its definitions should be used to 
determine “the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise.” 1 
U.S.C. § 1. 
 321. Id. at 1133–37. 
 322. Id. at 1137 n.12. 
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Hobby Lobby district court,323 and the opinion received widely disparate 
reactions from commentators in the interim between the decision and the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in June.324 
C. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby325 was a 
consolidation of Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius326 and Conestoga Wood.327  In 
total, it involved the claims of three closely held corporations: Hobby 
Lobby and Mardel, both owned by the Green family, and Conestoga Wood 
Specialties, a Pennsylvanian wood-working company owned by the Hahn 
family.328  Failure to comply with the contraception mandate would cost 
Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga Wood an estimated $475 million, 
$33 million, and $15 million respectively in annual fines under the ACA.329  
Given the apathetic treatment of the corporate claims by a majority of the 
circuit courts,330 the Supreme Court’s analysis of RFRA can be 
characterized as surprising.  Even more surprising to many was that Justice 
Alito authored the majority opinion which many believed would belong to 
Justice Kennedy, long thought to be the lone swing vote in the case, or to 
Chief Justice Roberts.331  Nevertheless, Justice Alito’s opinion dealt 
authoritatively with RFRA’s application and interpretation with respect to 
corporate claims. 
                                                 
 323. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub 
nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 324. For a critical analysis of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Hobby Lobby, see Alan E. 
Garfield, The Contraception Mandate Debate: Achieving a Sensible Balance, 114 COLUM. L. 
REV. SIDEBAR 1, 8–12 (2014). For an alternative perspective, see Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. 
Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit 
Corporations are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273 (2014). 
 325. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 326. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub 
nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 327. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 328. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764–66. 
 329. Id. at 2775. The businesses are fined $100 per day for each qualifying individual if 
they continue their practice of offering group health plans without covering the required 
contraceptives. This amounts to $1.3 million per day for Hobby Lobby, $90,000 per day for 
Mardel, and $40,000 per day for Conestoga Wood. Id. 
 330. See Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d 377. 
 331. See Mark Walsh, A “view” from the Court: Justice Alito has his day in finale, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 30, 2014, 5:08 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/a-view-from-
the-court-justice-alito-has-his-day-in-finale/; Lyle Denniston, Argument recap: One 
Hearing, two dramas, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 25, 2014, 4:50 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/argument-recap-one-hearing-two-dramas/. 
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1. RFRA’s Corporate Application 
Finally answering the most divisive question of the contraceptive 
mandate litigation, the Court found RFRA did in fact apply to for-profit, 
closely held corporations.332  Recognizing such a significant limitation on 
RFRA’s application would have “dramatic consequences,” thus, the 
majority reasoned the forfeiture requirement of RFRA’s protection of 
religious liberty to benefit from the corporate form was inconsistent with 
the statute’s broad mandate.333  After discussing the inclusion of 
corporations in the Dictionary Act’s definition of “person,” the Court 
observed that nonprofit corporations had repeatedly (and successfully) 
brought claims under RFRA.  The Court ultimately decided the 
nonprofit/for-profit distinction was not the dividing line Congress 
intended.334  “No known understanding of the term ‘person’ includes some 
but not all corporations.  The term ‘person’ sometimes encompasses 
artificial persons (as the Dictionary Act instructs), and it sometimes is 
limited to natural persons.  But no conceivable definition of the term 
includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but not for-profit 
corporations.”335  The Court also carefully pointed out its decision applied 
only to closely held corporations as none of the businesses before the Court 
were publicly traded; although, interestingly, the above rationale extends to 
this distinction as well.336 
Strict statutory interpretation aside, the principal argument that 
RFRA could not encompass for-profit corporations was simply that such 
entities are incapable of exercising religion.337  This was argued largely 
because of the profit motive itself.338  Yet, the Court maintained that 
general corporations may be created for any lawful purpose, including the 
advancement of humanitarian and religious objectives.339  Since the 
authenticity of religious belief was unchallenged,340 the Court rejected an 
interpretation that would allow a nonprofit corporation to exercise religion 
and prohibit RFRA application to those operating for-profit.341Essentially, 
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the majority adopted a rational, common sense approach to an issue which 
hamstrung multiple federal courts, and there is much to be said for this.  
The ability of an entity to exercise religion is present or absent, important or 
unimportant based solely on the existence of a profit motive.  To be sure, 
stating that any corporation has rights coterminous with individuals, or 
indeed any rights at all, is a legal fiction.342 
[Yet,] it is important to keep in mind that the purpose of 
this fiction is to provide protection for human beings.  A 
corporation is simply a form of organization used by 
human beings to achieve desired ends . . . .  When rights, 
whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to 
corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these 
people.343 
Such a point seems fundamental, but it took Supreme Court litigation to 
gain recognition.  Regardless, this characterization is drastically important.  
To make this point clear, Justice Alito cited the now infamous passage from 
the Hobby Lobby district court opinion declaring corporations unable to 
separately hold religious beliefs, pray, or worship.344  Justice Alito’s 
response forcefully cut through the hyperbole.  “All of this is true—but 
quite beside the point.  Corporations, ‘separate and apart from’ the human 
beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at 
all.”345 
2. RFRA’s Substantive Interpretation 
Having resolved the applicability issue, the Court was now free to 
address RFRA’s standards and the merits of the claims before it.  At this 
point, the majority drew a clear line in the sand regarding the substantial 
burden inquiry.  “Because the contraceptive mandate forces them to pay an 
enormous sum of money . . . if they insist on providing insurance coverage 
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in accordance with their religious beliefs, the mandate clearly imposes a 
substantial burden on those beliefs.”346  The Court clearly stated it would 
not evaluate the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s claim that the forced 
provision of abortifacients in company health plans was against their 
religious beliefs.  The Court stated the indirectness of the burden and the 
reasonableness of the religious beliefs, an important issue at the lower 
levels,347 was something federal courts had “no business addressing.”348 
The Court’s consideration of the compelling interest standard was 
rather short, and it assumed the provision of the contraceptives at issue was 
a sufficient interest.349  The more consequential portion of the Court’s 
analysis of RFRA’s standards was its focus on the last element: the least 
restrictive means requirement.350  In some respects, this was another 
surprise from Hobby Lobby because the government devoted most of its 
efforts to the compelling interest standard.351  In fact, the least restrictive 
means requirement of RFRA received very little treatment at the circuit 
court level.352  Thus, by relying on this portion of the RFRA standard, the 
Supreme Court’s analysis largely turned on an issue not fully addressed in 
lower courts.  Interestingly, once the focus of the Court shifted to the least 
restrictive means standard, the government essentially fell on its own 
sword. 
The least restrictive means requirement is “exceptionally 
demanding” and mandates the government show there is no other 
alternative to achieving its goals other than imposing the current burden on 
the plaintiff’s exercise of religion.353  The government simply could not do 
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this with respect to the contraception mandate because it had already 
created a built-in exemption for employers like churches and nonprofit 
organizations openly religious in nature.354  Moreover, the ACA itself does 
not apply to employers with fifty or less employees, resulting in the 
exemption of thirty-four million people, and a tremendous number of health 
insurance plans were grandfathered in under the ACA.355  From this 
perspective, the government could not argue that imposing the 
contraceptive mandate on this subset of employers was the least restrictive 
means of achieving its goals,356 and this is very likely why the government 
shunned this portion of the RFRA analysis throughout the litigation.  In 
fact, the government put forth no argument why it simply could not cover 
these costs itself.357  Ultimately, “[Health and Human Services] itself has 
demonstrated that it has at its disposal an approach that is less restrictive 
than requiring employers to fund contraceptive methods that violate their 
religious beliefs,” and thus, “[t]he contraceptive mandate, as applied to 
closely held corporations, violates RFRA.”358 
3. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion is noteworthy on several 
levels.  It primarily underscores the narrowness of the majority opinion in 
light of the mordant assertions of the dissent.359  The opinion is relatively 
short, and there is no mistaking its purpose: to underline “that the Court’s 
opinion does not have the breadth and sweep ascribed to it by the respectful 
and powerful dissent,” and Justice Kennedy is certainly correct.360  Indeed, 
the majority takes great care to explain this point. 
Our decision should not be understood to hold that an 
insurance-coverage mandate must necessarily fall if it 
conflicts with an employer’s religious beliefs.  Other 
coverage requirements, such as immunizations, may be 
supported by different interests (for example, the need to 
combat the spread of infectious diseases) and may involve 
different arguments about the least restrictive means of 
providing them.361 
Therefore, when Justice Kennedy reinforces this narrowness in his 
concurrence, it is relatively clear he will not regularly find exemptions to 
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governmental regulations through RFRA because there may be many other 
cases “in which it is more difficult and expensive to accommodate a 
governmental program to countless religious claims based on an alleged 
statutory right of free exercise.”362  This certainly is a sobering reminder to 
those who might view Hobby Lobby as a fundamental revitalization of 
RFRA that will continue to ripple through the free exercise landscape. 
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence displays how 
important the existing ACA exemptions are to the outcome of the case. As 
mentioned earlier, he was thought to be the lone swing vote in the case with 
the other eight Justices evenly and solidly divided.363  His concurrence 
certainly seems to prove this theory correct, but that is not the pertinent 
point here.  What truly matters is the future of RFRA’s interpretation in the 
wake of Hobby Lobby, and this is why Justice Kennedy’s perspective is 
uniquely significant.  The other four members of the majority may well 
have found a violation of RFRA without the existing exemptions under the 
ACA.364  Justice Kennedy, however, made evident that the existence and 
implementation of workable exemptions to the contraceptive mandate alone 
prompted him to vote the way that he did.  “But the Government has not 
made the second showing required by RFRA . . . the record in these cases 
shows that there is an existing, recognized, workable, and already-
implemented framework to provide coverage.  That framework is one that 
[Health and Human Services (“HHS”)] has itself devised . . . .”365  Justice 
Kennedy also took issue with the fact it was an agency (HHS) making the 
distinction rather than Congress itself, stating “RFRA is inconsistent with 
the insistence of an agency such as HHS on distinguishing between 
different religious believers—burdening one while accommodating the 
other—when it may treat both equally by offering both of them the same 
accommodation.”366  Together, these cautionary statements both publicly 
recognize the dissent’s objections and provide a clear signal that future 
RFRA applications, without such a convenient example of a workable 
alternative, may not find the Court, and especially Justice Kennedy, so 
receptive.367  This, together with his emphasis on the narrow, fact intensive 
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nature of the opinion, necessitates a much more cautious prediction about 
how the Court will interpret RFRA with respect to future claims. 
Overall, there is no doubt that Hobby Lobby is an important 
decision both for the protection of corporate conscience368 and, more 
generally, for the betterment of modern free exercise.  However, its benefit 
for the free exercise claimant is limited by RFRA’s narrow application.  
While the Court’s application of RFRA to for-profit, closely held 
corporations was the headline of the Hobby Lobby decision, the revival of 
the substantial burden analysis and the weight to which the Court ascribed 
to the least restrictive means requirement may actually prove to be the most 
important and long lasting effect of the decision.  Practically, the Court’s 
recognition of RFRA’s mandate and its strict interpretation of these 
standards will likely have more widespread application than RFRA’s 
inclusion of closely held corporations.369  This interpretation will find its 
way into courts across the country in all manner of suits, not just those 
involving corporations.370  Thus, Hobby Lobby will greatly affect even 
individual RFRA claims against the federal government, and this is 
possibly the decision’s greatest contribution to the protection of free 
exercise.  To be sure, RFRA’s application is still limited, but when it is 
available, the Hobby Lobby’s interpretation will guide the analysis. 
VI. LOOKING PAST HOBBY LOBBY TO THE PROTECTION OF CORPORATE 
FREE EXERCISE UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Hobby Lobby corrected a flawed interpretation of RFRA’s 
applicability and dramatically increased the importance of its least 
restrictive means requirement.  It also addressed some preconceived notions 
regarding corporate ownership and religious exercise.  What it did not do is 
alter existing Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, nor should it have.  
Hobby Lobby is a RFRA case, not a Free Exercise Clause case.371  As 
Justice Alito might say, its effect on the Free Exercise Clause interpretation 
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is “precisely zero.”372  Nor did it alter any form of free exercise protection 
for those burdened by state law since RFRA remains inapplicable to the 
states.373  Hobby Lobby added a fresh dose of reason to a tangled web of 
circuit precedent surrounding the ability of the closely held corporation to 
exercise religion within the meaning of RFRA.374  Therefore, any 
characterization of the decision as a fundamental alteration of modern free 
exercise law is misplaced.  The decision is a narrow one and highly fact 
specific, as Justice Kennedy was careful to point out.375  The litigation itself 
was the result of an unusual federal law with rather unique consequences.  
Nevertheless, there are significant analogies to be made between RFRA’s 
application to the corporate form and the argument for recognition of free 
exercise rights for corporations under the First Amendment.  Based on the 
Court’s rationale, there is reason to believe this is the next logical step in 
the present progression. 
Two major arguments can be made on this front.  First, given the 
Court’s analysis concerning RFRA’s protection of the closely held 
corporation, there is little logical distinction between this application and a 
similar interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.  Second, such an 
interpretation is consistent with other Supreme Court precedent regarding 
the extension of First Amendment rights to the corporate form.  This latter 
issue has only recently been explored in federal litigation.376 
A. Why is this Argument Even Necessary? 
One might well ask why there is a need for the protection of 
corporate free exercise rights under the First Amendment given the Court’s 
decision in Hobby Lobby.  At first glance it certainly may seem 
unnecessary, but, practically, there are multiple reasons why the Court 
should move in this direction.  First and foremost, there is a vast 
discrepancy in the protection of closely held corporations as the law 
currently stands.  Companies regulated by federal law who sue the federal 
government will have the benefit of the Court’s reinvestment in RFRA’s 
importance.  Whether their various RFRA claims will prove successful is 
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impossible to predict, but the salient point is that these companies will have 
a solid basis on which to assert their claims.  On the other hand, closely 
held corporations regulated under state law that wish to assert similar 
claims against state governments do not have the benefit of RFRA’s 
protection.377  Hobby Lobby, therefore, has no direct impact on these 
companies.  To be sure, a fair number of states have their own version of 
RFRA, and there is little doubt that the interpretation of these statutes will 
be influenced by Hobby Lobby’s rationale.378  Nevertheless, most states do 
not have such statutes, and this incongruent application will cause litigation 
and possibly produce a divided body of law similar to the one that lead to 
the Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby. 
The inclusion of corporate free exercise within the strictures of the 
Free Exercise Clause will also provide greater certainty to the protection of 
this right.  Hobby Lobby may well have been a major victory for closely 
held corporations that might assert religious claims simply because such 
claims now have a foundation.  However, it is far from certain that new 
RFRA claims will enjoy any significant success once removed from the 
specific facts of the ACA contraception mandate.  There are strong reasons 
to believe that the Court’s future RFRA decisions may not be as receptive 
to challenges of federal law where alternative schemes are less obvious.  In 
Hobby Lobby, the Court explicitly relied on the numerous pre-existing 
exceptions to the ACA mandate to prove a lesser restrictive statutory 
scheme could eliminate the religious burden.379  Justice Kennedy’s position 
is most precarious of all.  He made a clear effort to credit the dissent and 
point out that there will be cases “in which it is more difficult and 
expensive to accommodate a governmental program to countless religious 
claims,” and thus, his decision to join the majority was heavily fact 
specific.380  In the future, viable alternatives often will not present 
themselves so readily, and it may be much more difficult to garner a 
majority of the Court.  If this is the case, Hobby Lobby and its interpretation 
of RFRA may provide significantly less protection than first thought, 
leaving a need for the inclusion of these corporations in the Free Exercise 
Clause. 
Finally, with the prospect of litigation by closely held corporations 
outside the current scope of RFRA protection, there is a tremendous 
opportunity for a reinvigoration of free exercise debate across the country.  
In the interim between Smith and the initiation of the contraceptive mandate 
litigation, the significance of the Free Exercise Clause has been at an all 
time low and the broader free exercise discussion had become stagnant.  If 
the issue of corporate free exercise was to reach the Supreme Court before 
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it has the opportunity to reconsider Smith, it would provide an additional 
opportunity to reexamine the entire free exercise framework in the way that 
the Hobby Lobby case provided an opportunity to reexamine RFRA.  Even 
if these claims flounder languorously in the lower federal courts, there will, 
at a minimum, be a careful analysis of the Hobby Lobby rationale and its 
application to the Free Exercise Clause, and this will be a positive 
development for free exercise law. 
B. Hobby Lobby’s Rationale and the Free Exercise Clause 
Hobby Lobby did not address the application of its analysis to 
existing Free Exercise Clause doctrine,381 and the Supreme Court has never 
addressed this issue.382  Given the recent developments in the area of 
corporate free speech, that is not so surprising.383  Statutory analysis 
obviously entails vastly different interpretational considerations.384  
Accordingly, one must be attentive in analogizing RFRA’s statutory 
support of corporate religious exercise with constitutional free exercise.  
That cautionary note aside, there are important parallels to be made.  One of 
the most fundamental precepts of the Hobby Lobby decision is that 
corporate rights are created for the protection of the individuals associated 
with the corporation.385  This is a practical minded view applicable both to 
statutory and constitutional rights.386 
One of the principal bases for the denial of RFRA’s application to 
the corporate form at the circuit court level was the fact corporations are not 
living beings and, therefore, cannot exercise religion in any tangible 
sense.387  The logical force of this argument was found wanting in Hobby 
Lobby, and it should fare no better in the First Amendment context.388  “[I]t 
is important to keep in mind that the purpose of this fiction is to provide 
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protection for human beings.”389  Derisive remonstrations that corporations 
have no soul and cannot believe or otherwise function on their own prove 
little in debating the propriety of granting free exercise rights to closely 
held corporations.  While this sentiment infected the adjudication at lower 
levels,390 the rationality of Justice Alito’s response is compelling: “All of 
this is true—but quite beside the point.”391  A closely held corporation does 
not need the protection of the free exercise clause for its building, its 
charter, or it tax status.  In fact, it does not need such protection at all.  It is 
the protection of the religious freedom of the owners that is deserving of 
recognition whether or not they choose to operate their business in the 
corporate form.  This decision says nothing about the religious character of 
any individual.392  Thus, there is no reason to grant religious protection to 
the sole proprietor, yet, deny protection to the sole shareholder while the 
two conduct the same activities.393 
The for-profit, non-profit distinction similarly cannot justify the 
denial of corporate free exercise rights.  The argument put forth by some 
courts is that for-profit corporations cannot exercise religion because their 
sole purpose is to make money, as if one necessarily excludes the other.394  
“This flies in the face of modern corporate law.”395  Corporations can exist 
for any lawful purpose including the promotion of philanthropic, charitable, 
and humanitarian causes.396  Fundamentally, the religious nature of a 
corporation, or indeed any business, cannot be judged by its outward 
characteristics, and the protection of religious liberty should not be based 
on such facile considerations.  The free conscience of the individual is the 
relevant liberty interest and the fact a given business operates for profit 
does not alter this consideration. 
Corporate law and the corporate form more generally is a device 
created to promote the efficient use of capital and encourage market 
participation.  What justification exists then for requiring the choice 
between the forfeiture of free exercise rights and the benefits of 
incorporation?  The Court has recognized that “[i]t is rudimentary that the 
State cannot exact as the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of 
First Amendment rights.”397  The denial of free exercise protection simply 
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because an individual or a group of individuals wish to conduct the affairs 
of their corporation in a manner that is consistent with sincerely held 
religious belief is such a forfeiture.  Indeed, from an economic perspective, 
the lack of respect for the religious autonomy of the closely held 
corporation could be seen as a barrier to those with strong religious 
convictions who might otherwise participate in the market utilizing the 
corporate form and an advantage to those for whom this is not a factor.398  
The Hobby Lobby majority recognized that such a business must, “either 
give up the right to seek judicial protection of their religious liberty or forgo 
the benefits, available to their competitors, of operating as corporations.”399  
The argument for recognition of corporate religious autonomy under the 
First Amendment is not a plea for preferential treatment or an elevation of 
the corporation’s importance. It is a case for the recognition of the right to 
free exercise of religion for the individual in all walks of life. 
1. Authenticity of Belief 
Corporations, like Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, do not 
choose to marry corporate decision-making and religious faith in a vacuum.  
Very often there are serious financial consequences associated with such 
decisions, and these decisions shape the image of the company in the court 
of public opinion.  Yet such decisions are made nevertheless, and this 
points to sincerity and authenticity of religious belief.  Authenticity is a key 
issue because it removes any doubt concerning the motivation of a secular, 
for-profit corporation conducting its affairs in alignment with religious 
faith.  The financial ramifications for the companies in Hobby Lobby were 
dramatic as they faced tens of millions of dollars in fines per year under the 
ACA if their litigation did not succeed.400  Businesses like Hobby Lobby 
risk limiting their customer base, incurring significant costs in daily 
operations, and amassing huge legal fees all because of religiously 
motivated decisions.401  There is no reason to think its stance reflects 
anything other than sincerely held religious beliefs.402  Interestingly, nearly 
every court that has considered these claims, including those that rejected 
them, explicitly noted the authenticity of a business’s religious belief was 
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unquestioned.403  If this is the case and the religious claims of corporate 
ownership are genuine, then there is no basis on which to distinguish these 
claims from those of the individual with no corporate association, and such 
regulations should be subject to free exercise review just like any other.404  
Is it worth denying protection for authentic claims simply because there 
could be entities that attempt to take unfair advantage?  Surely it is far 
better to protect authentic belief and trust the judiciary to recognize the 
insincere opportunist.  Courts have already recognized this duty, and there 
is no reason to think them incapable in this context.405 
2. A Limitation on Scope 
The Supreme Court limited its application of RFRA to the only 
types of businesses before the Court in Hobby Lobby: closely held 
corporations.406  Given the opportunity, there is good reason to believe it 
can employ this same limitation with respect to the Free Exercise Clause.  
This, of course, would lead to the exclusion of the publicly traded company, 
but this delineation could prove highly useful. It may also be the only 
possible framework. 
However, this does not mean such an interpretation will be any less 
effective.  For one, there is likely little need for the inclusion of the publicly 
traded company.  By definition, these companies are owned by large 
numbers of diverse individuals, and the actions of their officers and boards 
of directors are carefully regulated by corporate law.  Their duty is to the 
best interest of the company, and it seems highly unlikely that this type of 
corporation would wish to assert religious rights.407  The real need lies with 
the closely held corporation in which there is often a small body of unified 
ownership.  By way of example, each of the three companies involved in 
the Hobby Lobby litigation are owned and operated by members of a single 
family.408  A free exercise limitation that recognizes this reality could help 
garner a majority of the Court while still serving the interests of those most 
likely to bring such claims.  In this way, the distinction drawn in Hobby 
Lobby could serve as a guidepost for a similarly limited holding in the 
context of the Free Exercise Clause, if such issue came before the Court, 
and such a limit would almost certainly increase the likelihood of success. 
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Ultimately, the Court’s rationale in Hobby Lobby provides a 
powerful foundation for the recognition of corporate free exercise rights 
under the First Amendment.  When limited to closely held corporations, 
there are numerous parallels between the analysis of corporate religious 
exercise under RFRA and the protection of corporate free exercise under 
the Free Exercise Clause.  The businessman can act in accordance with 
religious faith and free conscience while conducting the affairs of his 
company just as surely as when he acts for himself, and the current 
assumptions to the contrary stand in stark contrast to the historical 
reverence of the right of free exercise.  Hobby Lobby could well prove a 
watershed in this area, beginning the transition to a new outlook on the Free 
Exercise Clause, but there are still a great many briefs to be written before 
that takes place. 
C. The Court’s Protection of Corporate Free Speech and Its 
Importance for Corporate Free Exercise 
While the Supreme Court has never held that corporations are 
entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause,409 the application of 
the First Amendment to the corporate form is certainly nothing new in its 
precedent.  For individuals, the protections of the First Amendment are 
safeguarded by due process, and the Court has recognized that no 
alternative source of protection is necessary when applying the First 
Amendment to corporations.410  Moreover, “[i]t has been settled for almost 
a century that corporations are persons within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”411  There have also been major strides in this area 
in recent years.  In 2010, the Court decided a landmark case dealing with 
political speech and the corporate form.412  As with Hobby Lobby, there are 
significant parallels between the Court’s rationale and the argument for 
recognition of corporate free exercise rights. 
The strength of the comparison between corporate free speech and 
corporate free exercise actually stems from two different cases.  The first, 
First National Bank v. Bellotti, was decided in 1978 and held 
unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute forbidding specified corporations 
from spending money to influence the outcome of referenda.413  In so 
holding, the Court stated the relevant inquiry was not whether corporate 
rights were coextensive with the individual but whether the law at issue 
regulated activities the First Amendment was designed to protect.414  In 
distinguishing the right sought to be protected from the identity of the 
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claimant, the Court found the corporate form did not alter the protection of 
activities that would otherwise be sheltered by the First Amendment.415  
Over thirty years later, the Court again had occasion to consider the 
regulation of corporate political speech in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission.416  The federal statute at issue made it a felony for 
corporations, including nonprofits, to advocate for the election of any 
candidate within 30 days of primary elections or 60 days of general 
elections.417  The Court struck down the law as an unconstitutional 
restriction on political speech418 and expressly upheld Bellotti’s insistence 
that the free speech rights of corporations should not be interpreted 
differently simply because they are not natural persons.419  Together, these 
two precedents provide a solid foundation upon which to base the extension 
of free exercise to the corporate form. 
The analogy between Citizens United’s protection of corporate 
political speech and free exercise was made repeatedly at the circuit court 
levels in the litigation leading up to the Hobby Lobby decision, often as an 
issue of first impression.420  By and large, the argument did not have much 
success.  The Tenth Circuit offered some hopeful language, but none of the 
circuit courts that considered the issue in ACA litigation expressly held that 
the Citizens United rationale should be extended to the Free Exercise 
Clause.421  In reality, this is not so surprising since these courts are relying, 
as they should, on strict interpretations of existing precedent, but these 
concerns are much less pronounced at the Supreme Court level. 
The real concern is the underlying rationale employed by the 
majority of circuit courts when discussing Bellotti, Citizens United, and the 
application of the Free Exercise Clause to corporations.  Interestingly, 
several of the circuit courts place an unjustified amount of weight on oft-
quoted dicta contained in a Bellotti footnote discussing the notion of 
“purely personal” rights not provided to corporations such as the privilege 
against self-incrimination.422  Both the Third and D.C. Circuit expressly 
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relied on this footnote to make their determination about the extension of 
the Free Exercise Clause to the corporate form.  They formulated the 
standard as whether the right is so purely personal that it cannot be 
extended to corporations or whether the nature, history, and purpose of the 
Clause renders it inapplicable to the corporate form.423  There are two major 
flaws with reliance on such language.  First, Citizens United, clearly and 
explicitly reaffirmed Bellotti and its principle “that the Government lacks 
the power to ban corporations from speaking.”424  The Citizens United 
Court stated Bellotti’s central principle was that “the First Amendment does 
not allow political speech restrictions based on a speaker’s corporate 
identity.”425  Therefore, relying on a footnote for the proposition that 
corporate free exercise rights do not exist under the First Amendment in an 
opinion that expressly validates corporate rights of political speech is 
perplexing. 
Second, formulating the question presented as whether the history 
and purpose of the Free Exercise Clause dictates it should be applied to 
corporations clearly sets up the argument as a failure.  While the 
corporation is solidly engrained in American law, it certainly was unknown 
when drafting the First Amendment, and asking whether the history of the 
Clause supports its application to a modern legal device proves little.  
Moreover, these courts have largely ignored the “purpose” portion of the 
Bellotti footnote’s language and, instead, focused on the lack of precedent 
on the issue which is obviously quite thin given the willingness of these 
courts to place so much emphasis on a lone footnote.426 
Ultimately, the circuit court treatment of the use of these two 
precedents fails to give consideration to the central tenant of Bellotti, 
reaffirmed in Citizens United, that the relevant conduct should be the heart 
of the inquiry, not the identity of the claimant.427  The Citizens United Court 
made clear restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are 
impermissible because the First Amendment protects the act of political 
speech, not a special category of speakers.428  If “political speech does not 
lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its source is a 
corporation,’” what distinction exists to decide free exercise is of lesser 
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importance based on the same consideration?429  Our hard won First 
Amendment rights are not dependent on such economic concerns.430  The 
First Amendment Free Speech Clause protects speech, not the speaker, and 
the Free Exercise Clause should be interpreted to protect the free exercise 
of religion regardless of the believer’s identity.  “There is simply no support 
for the view that the First Amendment, as originally understood, would 
permit the suppression of political speech by media corporations,” and, 
“[t]he Framers may have been unaware of certain types of speakers or 
forms of communication, but that does not mean that those speakers and 
media are entitled to less First Amendment protection.”431 
Free speech, including political speech, was of such import both to 
the Founders and the Court that concern for protection of the right was the 
central concern, not the speaker.432  Similarly, it is the right of free exercise 
that is the heart of the Free Exercise Clause, not the enumeration of certain 
practitioners.  The Founders likely did not foresee corporations as entities 
capable of the exercise of religion just as they did not foresee them as 
valuable sources of political speech, but that is not justification for a 
reduction in the importance of the First Amendment.  If this principle is 
analyzed alongside the purpose and historical understanding of the Free 
Exercise Clause, there is good reason to think the analogy between the 
Court’s interpretation of corporate free speech and the argument for 
corporate free exercise could yield fruitful results.  Such a debate, though 
perhaps of lesser significance than the long overdue reinterpretation of the 
Court’s general free exercise jurisprudence, is nonetheless an important part 
of the argument for a renewed emphasis on free conscience and the Free 
Exercise Clause and one that may be seen as a natural extension of the 
Court’s most recent decision in the area. 
CONCLUSION 
If there is to be a respect for the individual right of free exercise 
and free conscience more broadly in American society, it must be first 
resurrected in our modern legal doctrine.  The inviolability of generally 
applicable laws and the increasing disregard of religion’s importance in 
society have caused a steep decline in free exercise protection.  Individual 
conscience today is sacrificed in the name of uniformity and practicality, 
but these considerations cannot be made to trump the First Amendment.  
Our Founders did not envision free exercise as an occasional privilege to be 
balanced with pragmatic concerns.  Current free exercise law subordinates 
religious liberty to judicial efficiency, and the longer this trend goes 
unchecked, the more difficult it will be to regain what we have lost.  Our 
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excuse may well be that such a movement seemed laudable, progressive, or 
even necessary.  It may be that vigilant and jealous protection of free 
exercise seems too burdensome.  It may also be that when free conscience 
is left to the grace of the sovereign,433 such excuses will seem trivial in 
hindsight. 
The historical underpinnings of the Free Exercise Clause and 
individual liberty of conscience represent more than legal theory.  The 
reverence these rights enjoyed was a result of a more fundamental view of 
the interplay between government and religion and their respective roles.  
Professor McConnell surely reflects this idea better than anyone. 
At its very core, the Free Exercise Clause, understood as 
Madison understood it, reflected a theological position: that 
God is sovereign.  It also reflected a political theory: that 
government is a subordinate association.  The theological 
and political positions are connected.  To recognize the 
sovereignty of God is to recognize a plurality of authorities 
and to impress upon government the need for humility and 
restraint.  To deny that the government has an obligation to 
defer, where possible, to the dictates of religious 
conscience is to deny that there could be anything like 
“God” that could have a superior claim on the allegiance of 
the citizens—to assert that government is, in principle, the 
ultimate authority.  Those are propositions that few 
Americans, today or in 1789, could accept.434 
While many will disagree, as is their right, about whether this is the way 
our society should continue to view free exercise today, there is no dispute 
about the veracity of this characterization from a historical perspective.  
Any other construction requires a willful decision to ignore the rich 
religious history of our nation.  Such a decision can be reached in the name 
of modernity and progressivism, but that choice transfers ownership of 
conscience to society and its government just as surely as it takes it away 
from the individual, and there are still many people who would not make 
such a bargain. 
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